Jam 1:1. Address and greeting. James calls himself a “servant of God, and of the Lord Jesus Christ.” Oecumenius correctly: Θεοῦ μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς, κυρίου δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ; some expositors have incorrectly taken Θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου together as applied to Ἰησ. Χρ. There is here no combination of the Old and New Testaments in this conjunction (against Lange). It is to be observed that in the apostolic addresses our Lord’s name is always given in full: Ἰησοῦς Χριστός.
Δοῦλος] is here an official appellation, which, however, belongs not only to the apostles, but to every possessor of an ecclesiastical office received from the Lord; comp. particularly Php 1:1 : Παῦλος καὶ Τιμόθεος, δοῦλοι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, and Jud 1:1. In this name the consciousness is expressed that the office is a service in which not our own will, nor the will of other men, but only of God or of Christ, is to be fulfilled. Oecumenius: ὑπὲρ πᾶν δὲ κοσμικὸν ἀξίωμα οἱ τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόστολοι τό δοῦλοι εἶναι Χριστοῦ καλλωπιζόμενοι, τοῦτο γνώρισμα ἑαυτῶν βούλονται ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ λέγοντες καὶ ἐπιστέλλοντες καὶ διδάσκοντες.
Ταῖς δώδεκα φυλαῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ] A designation of the people of Israel living outside of Palestine, and dispersed among the Gentiles. On αἱ δώδεκα φυλαί it is to be observed, that although this appellation of the people of Israel after the exile does not occur in the Apocrypha, yet the people who returned were still regarded as the twelve tribes (1Es 7:8-9); as the people of the twelve tribes are the covenant people, to whom the promises given to the patriarchs refer; from which it is to be explained that in the N. T. the number twelve is particularly emphasized (Mat 19:28; Rev 7:4-8; Rev 21:12), and that James designates by this name the people to whom the promise was fulfilled. On τῇ διασπορᾷ, see Deu 30:4; Neh 1:9; Psa 147:2; 2Ma 1:27 (Jer 15:7); Joh 7:35; Winer’s Realwörterbuch, article “Zerstreuung.” Whether this designation is to be understood in a literal or symbolical sense, see Introduction, sec. 2. Laurentius, Hornejus, Hottinger, Pott, Gebser, Kern, Schneckenburger, Neander, Guericke, Schmid (bibl. Theol.), Wiesinger, and others correctly consider the Epistle as addressed to Jewish Christians; only it is to be observed that with the early composition of the Epistle these are not here to be considered as contrasted with the Gentile Christians. Had the author been conscious of such a contrast, it would have been elsewhere indicated in the Epistle itself.
χαίρειν] sc. λέγει; see 1Ma 10:18; 1Ma 10:25; 1Ma 15:16; 2Ma 1:1; and in the N. T. Act 15:23; Act 23:26 (2Jn 1:11). It is to be observed that this very form of greeting, elsewhere not used in the N. T. Epistles, occurs in the writing proceeding from James, Act 15:23 (Kern); the pure Greek form of greeting is more fully: χαίρειν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ πράττειν, 2Ma 9:19.
Jam 1:2. James begins with the hortative words: πᾶσαν χάραν ἡγήσασθε] esteem it complete joy. πᾶσα χάρα, complete joy = nothing but joy. Luther: “Esteem it pure joy.” Many old expositors incorrectly explain πᾶσα = μεγίστη, summum, perfectum gaudium;[35] it is more correct to resolve the adjective here by the adverb ΠΆΝΤΩς, ὍΛΩς (Carpzov), with which the explanation of Theile coincides: rem revera omnique ex parte laetam. The meaning is: the ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΟΊ are to you a joy which is entire joy, excluding all trouble. See Hom. Od. xi. 507. πᾶσαν ἀληθείην μυθήσομαι, i.e. “of Neoptolemus I will declare to thee the whole truth” (i.e. nothing but the truth, which excludes all falsehood).
χαρά, a metonymy = gaudendi materia, res laeta; see Luk 2:10.
It is not improbable that James by this exhortation to joy refers to the ΧΑΊΡΕΙΝ in Jam 1:1; comp. Jam 1:5; Jam 1:19 (Wiesinger).
The address ἈΔΕΛΦΟΊ ΜΟΥ (or ἈΔΕΛΦΟΊ alone, Jam 4:11, Jam 5:7; Jam 5:9; Jam 5:19; also ἈΔΕΛΦΟΊ ΜΟΥ ἈΓΑΠΗΤΟΊ, Jam 1:16; Jam 1:19, Jam 2:5), which is James’ constant form, expresses the consciousness of fellowship, namely, the fellowship in nationality and belief (Paraeus), with the readers.[36]
ὅταν πειρασμοῖς περιπέσητε ποικίλοις] περιπίπτειν involvit (a) notionem adversi, (b) notionem inviti atque inopinati (Theile); it is synonymous with ἐμπίπτειν (see Luk 10:30 compared with Luk 1:36), but has a stronger meaning: to fall into something, so that one is entirely surrounded by it; thus in the classics it is particularly used of misfortune: συμφοραῖς, Plato, Leg. ix. 877e; ζημίαις καὶ ὀνείδεσι, Isocrates, i. 39.
By ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΟΊ are commonly here understood the ΘΛΊΨΕΙς, which are prepared for Christians on account of their faith by an unbelieving world (comp. Luk 8:13 : ΚΑῚ ἘΝ ΚΑΙΡῷ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΟῦ ἈΦΊΣΤΑΝΤΑΙ; in connection with Mat 13:21 : ΓΕΝΟΜΈΝΗς ΘΛΊΨΕΩς Ἢ ΔΙΩΓΜΟῦ ΔΙᾺ ΤῸΝ ΛΌΓΟΝ, ΕὐΘῪς ΣΚΑΝΔΑΛΊΖΕΤΑΙ); and undoubtedly James had these in view. Yet there is nothing in the context which necessitates us to such a limitation; rather the additional epithet ΠΟΊΚΙΛΟΙ justifies us to extend the idea, and to understand by it all the relations of life which might induce the Christian to withdraw from the faith, or to become wavering in it. When Lange explains ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΟΊ specially of “the allurements and threats by which the Gentiles on the one side, and the fanatical Jews on the other, and also the Ebionites, who were already in the field, sought to draw the readers to their side,” he founds this particular statement on his erroneous view of the tendency of the Epistle. To refer the idea only to inward temptations (Pfeiffer) is the more erroneous, as it is even questionable whether James had these in view at all.
On ποικίλοις, see 2Co 6:4 ff; 2Co 11:23 ff. The adjective does not allude to the different sources from which the ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΟΊ sprung, but is to be referred to their manifold forms. In a far-fetched manner, Lange finds in ΠΟΙΚΊΛΟΙς, according to its original meaning, “an allusion to the manifold-dazzling glitter of colours of the Jewish-Christian and Jewish temptations, in which they might even represent themselves as prophetic exhortations to zeal for the glory of God.”
Inasmuch as the Christian has to rejoice not only in the πειρασμοῖς, but on account of them, Oecumenius strikingly observes: τὴν κατὰ Θεὸν λύπην καὶ τοὺς πειρασμοὺς τούτους καὶ ἐπαινετοὺς οἶδε καὶ χαρᾶς ἀξίους· δεσμὸς γὰρ οὗτοί εἰσιν ἀῤῥαγής, καὶ αὔξησις ἀγάπης καὶ κατανύξεως … οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐκτὸς γυμνασίων οὔτε κοσμικῶν οὔτε τῶν κατὰ Θεὸν στεφάνων ἀξιωθῆναι. With reference to joy in ΘΛΊΨΕΙς, see Mat 5:11-12; Act 4:23 ff; Act 5:41; Rom 5:3; also Sir 2:1 ff.; particularly comp. the parallel passage 1Pe 1:6.
[35] Winer (p. 101 [E. T. p. 138]) explains πᾶσα χαρά “all (full) joy.” This would signify such a joy as wants nothing; which, however, does not suit the context.
[36] Incorrectly Semler: Hoc nomen praecipue de doctoribus intelligo.
Jam 1:3. γινώσκοντες] whilst ye may know (“in the consciousness,” de Wette). The participle, when closely connected with the imperative, participates in its meaning; see author on 2Ti 2:23; comp. 1Co 15:58; Col 3:24; Col 4:1; Heb 10:34, and other passages. It is neither simply the imperative: Luther, “and know ye,” nor simply a confirmation, so that it may be rendered by γινώσκετε γάρ (Pott).
ὅτι τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν (τῆς πίστεως). τὸ δοκίμιον (only here and in 1Pe 1:7) = τὸ δοκιμεῖον, is properly the means of proving: quo quid exploratur (Pott); quo rei, quae sub examen vocatur, manifestatur sinceritas eaque probatur omne id intrinseca virtute possidere, quod extrinsecus specie ac nomine prae se fert (Heisen): thus = κριτήριον; so in Dionysius Halicarnassus, rhetor. 11: δεῖ δὲ ὥσπερ κανόνα εἶναι καὶ στάθμην τινὰ καὶ δοκίμιον ὡρισμένον πρὸς ὅ τις ἀποβλέπων δυνήσεται τὴν κρίσιν ποιεῖσθαι; yet generally to the idea of proving is attached that of purification and verification. Theile = probamentum; thus Herodian, ii. 10, 12: δοκίμιον δὲ στρατιωτῶν κάματος ἀλλʼ οὐ τρυφή; and the LXX. Pro 27:21 : δοκίμιον ἀργυρίῳ καὶ χρυσῷ πύρωσις; comp. Pro 17:3; Psa 12:7; Sir 2:5. Many expositors, as Semler, Pott, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, Theile, Bouman, adhere to the import of means, whether of proof or of purification and verification,[37] whilst they understand thereby the above-mentioned ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΟΊ. In this case ΤῸ ΔΟΚΊΜΙΟΝ stands for ΤΟῦΤΟ ΤῸ ΔΟΚΊΜΙΟΝ (Pott); but the necessity of supplying ΤΟῦΤΟ is decisive against this interpretation; besides, ΔΟΚΊΜΙΟΝ in 1Pe 1:7 cannot have that meaning. In that passage ΔΟΚΊΜΙΟΝ is = the verification effected by proof; see author in loco: and thus it is probable that this import is also here to be retained (Oecumenius = τὸ κεκριμένον, τὸ δεδοκιμασμένον, τὸ καθαρόν); τὸ δοκίμιον then is = ΔΟΚΙΜΉ in Rom 10:4. The distinction, that in that passage ΔΟΚΙΜΉ is designated as the effect, but in this as the cause of ὑπομονή, is not against this view, for, as Tirinus well says: duae res saepe sibi invicem sunt causa.[38] Most expositors, both ancient and modern, however, explain δοκίμιον here by exploratio, probatio, proof in an active sense; thus Didymus, Bede, Calvin, Laurentius, Beza, Piscator, Paraeus, Serarius, Paes, Hornejus, Baumgarten, de Wette, Kern, Wiesinger, Lange, etc. Then is valid what Bede says in reference to Rom 5:4 : Verborum differentia non sensuum in his sermonibus esse probatur Apostolorum, since there θλῖψις, here proof by θλῖψις, is named as the cause of ὑπομονή. Though there is nothing against this idea, this explanation is wanting in linguistic accuracy.[39] The meaning is, in essentials, the same, whether we read τῆς πίστεως or not; for the δοκίμιον of Christians consists in nothing else than that of their faith, by which they are Christians.
πίστις is here not used objectively = id cui fides habetur, ipsa Jesu Christi doctrina (Pott), but subjectively, assured confidence in the gospel, whose contents are Jesus Christ, as the necessary foundation of Christian conduct.
κατεργάζεται ὑπομονήν] κατεργάζεσθαι is distinguished from ἐργάζεσθαι in that it expresses the actual accomplishment (Meyer on Rom 1:27).
ὑπομονή is faithful endurance (μένειν) under (ὑπο) the temptations (πειρασμοῖς). Baumgarten: “enduring constancy;” Theile: “stedfastness,” perseverantia, quod majus est quam patientia.[40] The importance of ὑπομονή for Christians is evident from Mat 10:22; Mat 24:13; comp. also Jam 5:7 ff. On the connection of ὑπομονή with ἐλπίς, see Cremer under the words ἐλπίς and ὑπομονή.
[37] Theile: Calamitates, quae natura sua virtutis πειρασμοί, eam sub examen discrimenque vocant, accedente demum hominis strenua opera ejusdem virtutis fiunt δοκίμιον eam purgantes, firmantes, commonstrantes.
[38] Wiesinger incorrectly maintains: “It is an erroneous idea that verification (τὸ δεδοκιμάσθαι) produces ὑπομονή” (so also Rauch in his Review); for the Christian always obtains more ὑπομονή, in which only he can reach the goal of perfection, not because he is tried, but because he stands the test and is thus verified.
[39] Cremer (see δοκίμιον) is hardly right when he maintained that “the means of proof are not only, e.g., the touchstone itself, but also the trace of the metal left thereon, therefore τὸ δοκίμιον τῆς πίστεως (Jam 1:3) is the result of the contact of πίστις with πειρασμοῖς;” for we are to consider the πειρασμοί not as a touchstone, but as a test by fire. However, Cremer explained the whole idea correctly by “the verification of faith.” His remark on δοκιμή is to be noted: that in it we are not to distinguish between the active and passive signification; that it has rather a reflex sense, either the having proved true or the proving true.
[40] Cicero, de inv. ii. 54: Patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio; perseverentia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio. Schneckenburger strikingly observes: Si submissionem (τὸ ὑπο …) urgeas, patientiam ac tolerantiam malorum, sin τὸ μένειν, constantiam et firmitatem, perseverantiam ac calamitatum ferendarum fortitudinem ab illecebris desciscendi inconcussam hoc vocabulo habebis expressam.
Jam 1:4. The verification of faith effected by the πειρασμοί produces ὑπομονή, and on this account temptations should be to the Christian an object of joy, as it depends on them that ὑπομονή is of the right kind. This is indicated in this verse. Oecumenius rightly observes: σκόπει οὐκ εἶπε τὴν ὑπομονὴν ὁριστικῶς, ὅτι ἔργον τέλειον ἔχει, ἀλλὰ προστακτικῶς ἐχέτω· οὐ γὰρ προϋποκειμένην ἀρετὴν ἐξαγγέλλει, ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐγγινομένην, ὡς χρὴ γίνεσθαι νομοθετεῖ.
ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω] The emphasis is not placed on ἔργον,-that ὑπομονή has an ἔργον is understood of itself,-but on τέλειον (Wiesinger). James wishes that the ἔργον of ὑπομονή among Christians be τέλειον, in order that they may be τέλειοι: as he, moreover, strongly emphasizes τέλειον εἶναι. In explaining the thought, de Wette confounds the abstract (ὑπομονή) with the concrete (ὁ ὑπομένων), and understands by ἔργον τέλειον “the active virtue which the patient man must perfectly have.” This explanation of de Wette agrees in essentials with the explanations of Erasmus, Calovius, Morus, Pott, Augusti, Gebser, Kern, Schneckenburger, according to which ἔργον τέλειον is distinguished from ὑπομονή, and the moral activity which the Christian has to exercise with his ὑπομονή indicated. Thus Erasmus: quemadmodum in malis tolerandis fortis est et alacris, ita in bonis operibus exercendis sibi constet. Pott: perseverantiae fructus sit perfectum virtutis studium. This interpretation is, however, incorrect; it not only gives rise to unjustifiable changes of meaning, as that of ὑπομονή into ὁ ὑπομένων, or of ἐχέτω into παρεχέτω (Pott), or into κρατείτω (Schulthess), but gives also a thought which with the following ἵνα κ.τ.λ. would be tautological. Most expositors (even Brückner,[41] in opposition to de Wette) refer ἔργον τέλειον to ὑπομονή itself; ἔργον = work, realization (Wiesinger); comp. 1Th 1:3 : τὸ ἔργον τῆς πίστεως; for the ὑπομονή of the Christian is not only a suffering, but even more a doing. This doing is to be τέλειον, that is, not only, as many interpreters explain, enduring to the end (Luther: “patience is to continue stedfast to the end;” Calvin: haec vera crit patientia, quae in finem usque durabit; similarly Jerome, Serarius, Salmero, Estius, Gomarus, Piscator, Piraeus, Hornejus, Carpzov, Semler, Hottinger, etc.), but complete, and that not only in respect of its internal condition,-so that it is wanting in no essential points of true ὑπομονή,-but also in respect of its activity (Lange[42]), so that it in no way yields to the ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΟῖς, which yielding occurs when a man by the temptations is determined to something which does not correspond with the principle of faith. Bouman: Haec ὙΠΟΜΟΝΉ consummatum opus habet, quando ita se gerit, in quo habitat, homo, ut universam per vitam et animum et linguam et pedes regat ac moderetur. That ὙΠΟΜΟΝΉ in this manner has an ἜΡΓΟΝ ΤΈΛΕΙΟΝ is necessary, in order that Christians may be perfect and entire, which as Christians they should be. This James indicates in the following words: ἽΝΑ ἮΤΕ ΤΈΛΕΙΟΙ ΚΑῚ ὉΛΌΚΛΗΡΟΙ] ἽΝΑ is not here ἘΚΒΑΤΙΚῶς (which Baumgarten and Pott regard as possible), but ΤΕΛΙΚῶς, in order that. De Wette and Wiesinger incorrectly refer it to the future judgment.
τέλειοι and ὉΛΌΚΛΗΡΟΙ are synonymous terms; ΤΈΛΕΙΟς is properly “that which has attained its aim,” ὉΛΌΚΛΗΡΟς “that which is complete in all its parts, is entire.” Both expressions are found in the LXX. as the translation of תָּמִים (Gen 6:9; Eze 15:5); besides this verse, ὉΛΌΚΛΗΡΟς in the N. T. only occurs in 1Th 5:25 (ὉΛΟΚΛΗΡΊΑ, Act 3:16).[43] It is true that both τέλειος (in the LXX. and in the classics) and ὁλόκληρος (particularly in Philo, but not in the LXX.) are used with special reference to sacrifice; to which, however, there is here no allusion (against Kern). Still more arbitrary is the interpretation of Storr: qui superiores e certamine discedebant.
ἐν μηδενὶ λειπόμενοι] the negative expression added for strengthening the two positive expressions; as in Jam 1:5 : ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος, and in Jam 1:6 : ἐν πίστει, μηδὲν διακρινόμενος. As regards the expression itself, ἐν μηδενί is not to be taken, with de Wette, as a supplement to λειπόμενοι, as the supplement to this verb is always in the genitive; therefore the expression has been correctly translated by Wiesinger and in this commentary, not by wanting nothing, but by wanting in nothing (which Lange has overlooked). The question, however, occurs, can λειπόμενοι be explained as = wanting? This idea is not contained in the verb by itself, and therefore can hardly be attributed to it when it stands absolutely, as here. It is therefore safer to take λείπεσθαι in its usual meaning, and thus, with Lange, to explain λειπόμενοι by coming short of, namely, short of the goal marked out to the Christian. It is incorrect, with Pott, to say: tota loquendi ratio ab iis qui cursu … relinquuntur et seperantur (so also Lösner, Krebs, Storr, Augusti); for although the verb in classical writers has often this reference, yet there is here no mention of a relation to others, and accordingly the appeal to Polybius, p. 1202, ed. Gronov.: ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους εὐνοίᾳ παρὰ πολὺ τἀδελφοῦ λειπόμενος, does not suit. According to the meaning here given, λειπόμενοι forms a strong contrast to τέλειοι.
[41] “Nothing else can be meant than the perfect work of endurance, particularly as different stages of this are conceivable.”
[42] Lange here arbitrarily understands by ἔργον τέλειον specially: “the unreserved acknowledgment of their Gentile-Christian brethren, the open rupture with Jewish pride of faith and fanaticism.”
[43] A limitation of this idea to moral perfection is not required by the context. Lange has the following strange remark: “The Jew was a symbolical κλῆρος of the household; as a Christian he was to become a real κλῆρος, and thus ὁλόκληρος.”
Jam 1:5. εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν λείπεται σοφίας] is chiefly connected with ἐν μηδενὶ λειπόμενοι. εἰ is not = quoniam, quandoquidem (Estius, Laurentius), but the thought is hypothetical; εἴ τις = ὅστις; see Wahl on the word εἰ.
λείπεται σοφίας is to be explained as κτεάνων λειφθεὶς καὶ φίλων, in Pindar i. 2. 11, “without wealth and friends,” properly “left behind of, or falling short of;” accordingly without wisdom. Usually the meaning wanting, lacking, is given to λείπομαι, which, however, is not linguistically justified. James by σοφία, as Wiesinger correctly observes, does not mean “an arbitrary part of Christian perfection,” but the essential foundation of Christian conduct, τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τελείου ἔργου (Oecumenius); for σοφία is here the living insight, rooted in the πίστις, i.e. the insight compelling to action in what is the Christian’s duty, both in whole and in its particular parts, especially in the πειρασμοῖς (Jam 1:2) (comp. the praise of wisdom in the Proverbs of Solomon, in the Wisdom of Solomon, and in the Book of Ecclesiasticus). Wisdom can only be given by God (κύριος δίδωσι σοφίαν καὶ ἀπὸ προσώπου αὐτοῦ γνῶσις καὶ σύνεσις, Pro 2:6), and as a divine χάρισμα it has an impress definitely distinguishing it from the wisdom of the world; see chap. Jam 3:15; Jam 3:17.[44] The connection does not constrain us, with Bouman and others, to conceive the idea of σοφία only in reference to the πειρασμοί (Jam 1:2), and to understand by it only the doctrine concerning the Christian conduct in the πειρασμοῖς, expressed in Jam 1:2 (Calvin: Sapientiae nomen ad circumstantiam praestantis loci restringo, acsi dicerete. si haec doctrina ingenii vestri captu altior est, petite a Domino, ut vos Spiritu suo illuminet), or that conduct itself. The idea of σοφία is rather to be understood in its completeness (Theile, de Wette, Kern, Wiesinger). The reason why James here mentions it is because it was especially necessary to the Christian in his πειρασμοῖς; Brückner: “James thinks here of wisdom (in itself of a more general acceptation), inasmuch as it is necessary rightly to estimate and rightly to resist the trial, in order that it might not be converted into an internal temptation, instead of being the path to perfection.”[45]
ΑἸΤΕΊΤΩ ΠΑΡᾺ Κ.Τ.Λ.] the same construction in Mat 20:20; Act 3:2; 1Jn 5:15.
ΤΟῦ ΔΊΔΟΝΤΟς ΘΕΟῦ] instead of ΤΟῦ ΘΕΟῦ ΤΟῦ ΔΊΔΟΝΤΟς, as Codex A reads. By the selected order of the words here, not only is the idea of giving emphatically placed near to the request, but also the participle almost becomes an attributive adjective; God is indicated as the Giver absolutely. Accordingly-as Baumgarten, Gebser, and others correctly remark-no definite object as ΤῊΝ ΣΟΦΊΑΝ (Bouman) is to be supplied.
ΠᾶΣΙΝ and ἉΠΛῶς are added as a more detailed statement; ΤΟῖς ΑἸΤΟῦΣΙΝ is from the context to be supplied to ΠᾶΣΙΝ (Calvin, Estius, Piscator, Laurentius, etc.); or, better still, ΟἾς ΔΊΔΩΣΙ. The adverb ἉΠΛῶς, only here in the N. T., is either to be understood as an ethical additional statement of ΔΊΔΟΝΑΙ = ἘΝ ἉΠΛΌΤΗΤΙ (Rom 12:8) (so Pott, Hottinger, Kern, Theile, Bouman, uncertainly Wiesinger), or = simply, without further ceremony (so de Wette).[46] In the latter case it is prominently brought forward that God in the giving had only this in view. It is incorrectly rendered benigne (Bede, Vorstius, and others), affluenter (Erasmus, Grotius, and others), or as equivalent to συντόμως, καθάπαξ (Hesychius). By μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος-as καί shows
ἁπλῶς is not more closely defined, but a new point in the mode of the divine giving is added, and so that He does not reproach him to whom He gives, does not abuse him. ὀνειδίζειν is generally taken in the more special sense of upbraiding (Luther: “and upbraideth no man”); for which the expression in Demosthenes is appealed to: τὸ τὰς ἰδίας εὐεργεσίας ὑπομιμνήσκειν καὶ λέγειν μικροῦ δεῖν ὅμοιόν ἐστι τῷ ὀνειδίζειν; still more surely does Plutarch, de aud. 33, speak for this meaning: πᾶσα ὀνειδιζομένη χάρις ἐπαχθὴς καὶ ἄχαρις; also in Sir 18:18; Sir 20:15; Sir 41:22, the word appears to have this more special reference.[47] Still there is no proof that James did not take it in its more general sense. Semler: non tantum significat molestam commemorationem beneficiorem, sed etiam qualemcunque reprehensionem (so also Schneckenburger, de Wette).[48] It is incorrect to explain ὀνειδίζειν as equivalent to aliquem ignominose cum repulsa dimittere (Morus, Zachariae, Carpzov, Storr, Augusti, Stolz, Hottinger); the refusal of a petitioner may be considered as a ΚΑΤΑΙΣΧΎΝΕΙΝ of the same, but ὈΝΕΙΔΊΖΕΙΝ never occurs in this sense, not even in Sir 20:15. The reason why James subjoins the particular statement ἉΠΛῶς Κ.Τ.Λ. is by it to encourage to ΑἸΤΕῖΝ (Zwinglius: ut mentes alliciat, ut ad hunc unum in omni necessitate adcurrant); perhaps also with “a side glance to the rich” (Jam 1:10, chap. Jam 5:9 ff.), who do not give ἉΠΛῶς, and when they do give, give only ὈΝΕΙΔΊΖΟΝΤΕς (Wiesinger).
ΚΑῚ ΔΟΘΉΣΕΤΑΙ ΑὐΤῷ] impersonal: “it shall be given him;” namely, what he asks; here, wisdom. It is erroneous directly to supply Ἡ ΣΟΦΊΑ to ΔΟΘΉΣΕΤΑΙ as the subject (Lange), because James here evidently wishes to emphasize the relation of the giving to the asking, and accordingly the object is suppressed; comp. on this thought particularly 1Ki 3:9-12 (2Ch 1:10-12).
[44] The Etymologicum magnum thus gives the distinction between σοφία and γνῶσις: γνῶσις μέν ἐστι τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ ὄντα· σοφία δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰ ὄντα γινώσκειν, καὶ τὸ τὰ γνωστὰ πράττειν.
[45] Lange, indeed, defends the explanation of Calvin, but he interprets the idea of σοφία differently from Calvin, defining it as “the right perception of the signs of the times, and of the christological fulfilment of the theocracy in the church as well as in the faith of individuals.”
[46] Both of these explanations come essentially to the same thing, for “he that giveth with simplicity will simply give; it will be a pure, unmingled giving, without any admixture” (Stier). Lange, without reason, maintains that in this commentary ἀπλῶς will refer not to the giving, but to the gift.
[47] In this sense exprobare is used in Latin, e.g. Cicero, de amic.: Odiosum sane genus hominum officia exprobantium.
[48] Eustathius: ὀνειδίζειν οὐ μόνον τὸ εὐεργεσίας ἀναφέρειν τοῖς εὐεργετημένοις … ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀνοστά τινα καὶ ἐπίμομφα λέγειν. The assertion of Lange is unfounded, that James, according to this exposition, would utter an untenable sentiment, “because God, notwithstanding those who ask, often inflicts injuries on men.” Lange has not considered that the passage treats only of asking.
Jam 1:6. A more particular statement how prayer must be made; αἰτείτω δὲ ἐν πίστει] With αἰτείτω the αἰτείτω in Jam 1:5 is resumed; δέ indicates the carrying out of the thought.
The prayer, if it is to be heard, must be a εὐχὴ τῆς πίστεως, chap. Jam 5:15 (comp. Sir 7:10 : μὴ ὀλιγοψυχήσῃς ἐν τῇ προσευχῇ σου).
ἐν πίστει] that is, in the confident assurance of being heard; on what this is founded is not here expressed. The explanation of Calvin: fides est quae Dei promissionibus freta nos impetrandi, quod petimus, certos reddit (similarly Baumgarten), expresses what is in itself true, but is not here indicated by James. Some ancient commentators incorrectly supply to πίστει as a more definite statement Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.
The object of the prayer (namely, τὴν σοφίαν) is not here named, where only the necessary condition of prayer is treated of. The remarks made by many expositors on the manner in which the Christian should ask for external good things are here inappropriate.
μηδὲν διακρινόμενος] expresses the same idea as ἐν πίστει, only in a negative form; μηδέν is here, as frequently, adverbial = on no account, nulla ratione. διακρίνεσθαι is, according to N. T. usage, to doubt; compare besides Act 10:20; Act 11:12 : particularly Mat 21:21 : ἐὰν ἔχητε πίστιν καὶ, μὴ διακριθῆτε; Rom 4:20 : οὐ διεκρίθη τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ; Rom 4:23; it is not = ἀπιστεῖν (Luk 24:21), or ἀπειθεῖν (Joh 3:36), but includes in it the essential character of ἀπιστία; while πίστις says “Yes” and ἀπιστία “No,” διακρίνεσθαι is the conjunction of “Yes” and “No,” but so that “No” has the preponderance; it is that internal wavering which leans not to πίστις, but to ἀπιστία. The deep-lying ground of it is pride, and so far Theophylact is right in saying διακρινόμενος δὲ ὁ μεθʼ ὑπεροψίας αἰτῶν, ὑβριστὴς ὁμολογουμένως, ὁ διακρινόμενος; whereas Oecumenius, in the words: λέγων ἐν σεαυτῷ, ὅτι πῶς δύναμαι αἰτησαί τι παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου καὶ λαβεῖν, ἡμαρτηκὼς τοσαῦτα εἰς αὐτόν, brings out a point which belongs not to διακρίνεσθαι, but to a yet weak faith.[49] Comp. with this passage Hermas James 29: tolle a te dubitationem et nihil omnino dubites petens aliquid a Deo.
The following words: Ὁ ΓᾺΡ ΔΙΑΚΡΙΝΌΜΕΝΟς Κ.Τ.Λ., are annexed to the preceding ΔΙΑΚΡΙΝΌΜΕΝΟς, more clearly explaining it (in figurative language) with reference to the exhortation ΑἸΤΕΊΤΩ Κ.Τ.Λ.; but the reason of this exhortation is given in Jam 1:7. The first ΓΆΡ, accordingly, has the meaning of namely, whereas the second has that of for. According to this interpretation, the relation of the thoughts expressed in Jam 1:6-7 is more correctly recognised than when we say that the first γάρ assigns the reason why we should pray nothing doubting, but that this thought is only brought to a conclusion in Jam 1:7 (Wiesinger, and so in the earlier edition of this commentary, where it is said that the sentence taken together would read: Ὁ ΓᾺΡ ΔΙΑΚΡΙΝΌΜΕΝΟς, ἘΟΙΚῺς ΚΛΎΔΩΝΙ … ΜῊ ΟἸΈΣΘΩ, ὍΤΙ ΛΉΜΨΕΤΑΊ ΤΙ Κ.Τ.Λ.). Lange incorrectly supposes that the first ΓΆΡ has a more limited meaning, whilst it declares the ΔΙΑΚΡΙΝΌΜΕΝΟς as incapable of praying aright; whereas the second ΓΆΡ refers in a wider sense to the unbelieving condition of the man to God, and therefore is to be rendered by also.
ἔοικε] only here in the N. T. and in Jam 1:23.
ΚΛΎΔΩΝ ΘΑΛΆΣΣΗς] only here in the N. T. and in Luk 8:24 (ΚΛΥΔ. ΤΟῦ ὝΔΑΤΟς); usually ΚῦΜΑ. The verb ΚΛΥΔΩΝΊΖΕΣΘΑΙ occurs in Eph 4:14; Isa 57:20, LXX. The point of comparison is contained in the subjoined words: ἈΝΕΜΙΖΟΜΈΝῼ ΚΑῚ ῬΙΠΙΖΟΜΈΝῼ] The verb ἈΝΕΜΊΖΕΣΘΑΙ is entirely an ἍΠΑΞ ΛΕΓ. occurring nowhere else, equivalent to ἈΝΕΜΟῦΣΘΑΙ, found in classical language (see Hegesippus James 6: ἉΛῸς ἨΝΕΜΩΜΈΝΗς) = agitated, i.e. agitated by the wind. The verb ῥιπίζεΙΝ (only here in N. T.) is also elsewhere used to denote the agitation or excitement of water by the wind; see Dio Chrysostom, xxxiii. p. 368 B: ΔῆΜΟς ἌΣΤΑΤΟΝ ΚΑΚῸΝ ΚΑῚ ΘΑΛΆΣΣῌ ΠΆΝΘʼ ὍΜΟΙΟΝ, ὙΠʼ ἈΝΈΜΟΥ ῬΙΠΊΖΕΤΑΙ; Philo, de mundo: πρὸς ἀνέμου ῥιπίζεται τὸ ὕδωρ. Heisen incorrectly explains ῬΙΠΊΖΕΣΘΑΙ as equivalent to calefieri et accendi; the word never has this meaning, although used of the kindling of fire.[50] The two expressions (which Lange incorrectly denies) are synonymous, and are placed together only for the sake of strengthening the idea. The opinion that ἀνεμίζ. refers to agitation coming from without, and ῥιπίζ. to agitation coming from within (Bengel), is without foundation; also the assertion that the former word denotes the cause and the latter the effect (Theile, Wiesinger) is not entirely correct, as ἀνεμίζεσθαι itself expresses the effect.
By this image the mind of the doubter is characterized as unsteady and wavering, to which a calm and sure rest is wanting.[51] Comp. Isa 57:20-21, LXX.: οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι κλυδωνισθήσονται καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι οὐ δυνήσονται, οὐκ ἔστι χαίρειν (שָׁלוֹם) τοῖς ἀσεβέσιν.[52]
[49] As weak faith is to be distinguished from διακρίνεσθαι, so also is the doubt, of which the believer is conscious as a trial. Calvin strikingly remarks: Fieri quidem non potest in (hac) carnis infirmitate, quin variis tentationibus agitemur, quae sunt veluti machinae ad labefactandam nostram fiduciam: ita nemo reperietur, qui non sensu carnis suae vacillet ac trepidet. Sed oportet ejusmodi tentationes fide tandem superari, quemadmodum arbor, quae firmas radices jecit, quatitur quidem venti impulsu, sed non revellitur, quin potius suo loco stabilis manet.-Whilst the διακρινόμενος, according to the proper meaning of the term, will not believe, it is the longing of the tried to be confirmed in the faith.
[50] Theile correctly rejects this explanation, saying: “Hoc, quamquam undae spumantes ventis revera incalescunt Latinisque etiam ebullire aestusque dicuntur, longius tamen petitum est.”-The verb ῥιπίζειν comes either from ῥιπίς = (1) follis (a bellows); (2) flabellum, having the meaning both of kindling (the fire) and of fanning (for the sake of cooling); or from ῥιπή = vibration, which is also used of wind; thus ῥιπὴ Βορέαο, Il. xv. 171; ῥιπαὶ ἀνέμων, Sophocles, Ant. 137; also ῥιπή = storm, Pind. P. ix. 49. The original import of the German verbs schwingen, bewegen, is thus entirely equivalent to ἀνεμίζειν.
[51] “A doubtful petitioner offers not to God a steady hand or heart, so that God cannot deposit in it His gift,” Stier.
[52] Lange supposes that James has used these expressions with a conscious reference to the O. T. symbols, according to which the sea is “the emblem of the national life, agitated hither and thither in pathological sympathies,” whilst in his time “these waves of the sea” had already begun to roar.
Jam 1:7. μὴ γὰρ οἰέσθω] On γάρ, see Jam 1:6; it is neither the simple particle of transition (Pott), nor equivalent to ergo (Calvin), nor is it to he explained, with Winer [E. T. 558], according to its derivation from γε and ἄρα, by thus indeed; but is the reason for the exhortation in Jam 1:6; hence for.
The warning: μὴ οἰέσθω, supposes the fancy of the doubter, that he will receive something from God in answer to prayer; similarly Mat 3:9 : μὴ δόξητε.
ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος] refers back to ὁ διακρινόμενος. Although not in ἐκεῖνος (in itself), yet in the whole mode of expression, there is something disparaging.
By λήμψεται,[53] instead of δοθήσεται (Jam 1:5), is not intended to be indicated, that the fault of not being heard lies not with God but with man; rather he receives not, because God gives not.
τί naturally refers to what the doubter asks; thus scil. αἰτουμένων. The definite object (wisdom) above spoken of is not here meant; for the particular thought is founded on a general declaration. By κύριος Christ is not to be understood, but, as in chap. Jam 4:10, Jam 5:4; Jam 5:10, according to O. T. usage, God.
The designation of God as the Lord naturally suggested itself to James, because he was here speaking of the power of God manifested in giving or not giving; it is not, as Lange thinks, chosen in order to characterize God as “Jehovah the living covenant-God, who has now fully manifested Himself in Christ.”
[53] The form λήμψεται, for which MS. authorities decide, is not classical Greek; the lonic form is λάμψομαι.
Jam 1:8 contains neither the subject to λήμψεται (Baumgarten), nor is it to be understood as an exclamation = vae homini inconstanti (Pott). Many expositors consider ἀνὴρ δίψυχος as the subject and ἀκατάστατος the predicate, wanting the copula (Luther: “a doubter is unstable;” so Calvin, Schneckenburger, de Wette, Lange, and others); but according to this construction the idea δίψυχος falls too much into the background, and also the train of thought would be too unconnected. It is better to take both ἀνὴρ δίψυχος and ἀκατάστατος κ.τ.λ. as in apposition to ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος. It is true that the character of the doubter has already been given in Jam 1:6 by ἔοικε κ.τ.λ., but, on the one hand, only figuratively, and, on the other hand, without giving prominence to his ethical character, which James now introduces in order strongly to confirm the thought expressed in Jam 1:7; which exposition is far from being “a feeble tautology” (Lange). Less stress is to be put on the want of the article (Schneckenburger, de Wette), as it would be here hardly suitable. Correctly Winer, p. 497 [E. T. 670]: “he, a double-minded man;” so also Wiesinger, Brückner, Bouman, and others. Only according to this construction is the full meaning given to the idea δίψυχος. The word is not to be taken merely as another expression for διακρινόμενος (Luther, Beza, Grotius, Cremer, and others; Luther directly renders it “a doubter”), but it characterizes the inward nature of the doubter. According to the mode in which δισώματος, δικάρδιος, δίγλωσσος, and similar words are formed, δίψυχος (which occurs neither in the classics nor in the LXX. and the Apocrypha, but besides here only in chap. Jam 4:8, and the Church Fathers) properly denotes having two souls; it thus describes the doubter as a man who has, as it were, two souls contending against each other: one of which is turned to God, and one of which is turned away from God (thus to the world); who, accordingly, will be at the same time φίλος τοῦ Θεοῦ and φίλος τοῦ κόσμου, although φιλία τοῦ κόσμου is ἔχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ (chap. Jam 4:6).[54] This double-mindedness (or what is the same thing, division of soul) expresses the wavering to and fro, between ΠΊΣΤΙς and ἈΠΙΣΤΊΑ generally, so particularly also in prayer; therefore it is called, Constitut. Ap. vii. 11: μὴ γίνου δίψυχος ἐν προσευχῇ εἰ ἔσται, ἢ οὐ, and Clemens Romanus: ταλαίπωροι οἱ δίψυχοι, οἱ διστάζοντες τὴν ψυχήν; comp. Sir 1:28 : μὴ προσέλθῃς αὐτῷ (κυρίῳ) ἐκ καρδίᾳ δίσσῃ.
δίψυχον εἶναι is to be understood neither as the reason (Wiesinger) nor as the result (Lange), but as the characteristic nature of διακρίνεσθαι.
The word ἀνήρ is here as in Mat 7:24; Psa 32:2, LXX. Lange thinks that James used it because the dangers of which he warns them are more especially the dangers which threaten the men among the Jews.
As a second apposition James adds: ἈΚΑΤΆΣΤΑΤΟς ἘΝ ΠΑΣΑῖς ΤΑῖς ὍΔΟΙς ΑὙΤΟῦ] for where there is a want of unity in the internal life, it is also wanting in the external conduct. The ΔΊΨΥΧΟς, being actuated sometimes by one impulse and sometimes by another, is unsteady and inconstant in his intentions and actions (ἘΝ ΤΑῖς ὍΔΟΙς ΑὙΤΟῦ; comp. Psa 91:11; Jer 16:17; Pro 3:6, etc.); he walks not on one path, but as it is said in Sir 2:12 : ἐπιβαίνει ἐπὶ δύο τρίβους.[55] The word ἀκατάστατος is found only again in chap. Jam 3:8 and in the LXX. Isa 54:11 as the translation of סֹעֵר; the substantive ἀκαταστασία occurs in chap. Jam 3:16, besides in Luke and in the Epistles to the Corinthians.
The reason why the doubter is not heard is accordingly the disunion in which he is with himself, both in his internal and in his external life; God gives the heavenly gift of wisdom, which according to its nature is ἁγνή, only to him who ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ (Mat 22:37), has given to God an undivided disposition.
[54] Oecumenius limits the idea too specifically to a care divided about the present and the future: δίψυχον ἄνδρα τὸν ἀνεπέρειστον, τὸν ἀστήρικτον λέγει, τὸν μήτε πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα παγίως, μήτε πρὸς τὰ πάροντα ἀσφαλῶς ἡδρασμένον, ἀλλὰ τῇδε κακεῖσε ἀγόμενον καὶ περιφερόμενον, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν τῶν μελλόντων, ποτὲ δὲ τῶν παρόντων ἀντεχόμενον. In the classics related ideas are διάνδιχα μερμερίζειν, Hom. Il. i. 189, and frequently: διάνδιχα θυμὸν ἔχειν, Hesiod, O. 13; ψυχὴ ἀνάρμοστος, Phaed. 93 c (opp. ψυχὴ ὁμονοητική, Pl. Resp. viii. 554), etc. In the Hebrew, בְּלֵב וָלֵב, so in 1Ch 12:33, where בְּלֹא־לֵב וָלֵב is equivalent to בְּלֵבָב שָׁלֵם, ver. 38; that expression has another meaning in Psa 12:3.
[55] Schneckenburger incorrectly explains ἀποκατάστατος here of the fate of the doubter: parum constautiae experitur in omnibus, quae ipsi contingunt, sua culpa sorte varia conflictatur, and ὄδος = fortuna; also Heisen at least includes this idea: omnia vitae consilia ac facta quin et fata. This certainly is a possible explanation in itself, but it does not suit the context. The meaning attached to the word by Lange, “seditious disturber,” cannot be proved to be correct by Jam 3:16.
Jam 1:9-10. James subjoins to the idea that the doubter should not think that he should receive anything, the exhortation to the lowly brother; δέ non solum apponendo, sed opponendo gravius hortatur (Theile). At first view the natural sense is, with de Wette, Wiesinger, and most expositors, to take ὁ ἀδελφός as the general idea, which is specified by ὁ ταπεινός and ὁ πλούσιος. According to this view, ταπεινός is not equivalent to ταπεινὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ, Mat 11:29, but, in opposition to πλούσιος, must be taken in its proper sense: afflictus, particularly poor; on the other hand, ὁ πλούσιος is the earthly rich, equivalent to opulentus, fortunatus, affluens rebus externis. The exaltation (τὸ ὕψος), in which the brother of low degree is to glory, can naturally only be the heavenly dignity, which the Christian by his faith in Christ possesses, and whose future completion is guaranteed to him by the promise of the Lord; and, corresponding to this, by ταπείνωσις is to be understood the lowliness, which “belongs to the rich man as a Christian through Christ” (Wiesinger), which is essentially the same with his exaltation. There is nothing against this idea in itself; the same oxymoron would be contained in the expression, were we to say, according to 1Co 7:22 : “the δοῦλος rejoices in his ἐλευθερία, and the ἐλεύθερος in his δουλεία.” But the context is against this explanation: not only because the distinction of Christians into rich and poor would be here introduced quite unexpectedly, but also because Jam 1:2; Jam 1:12 show that the connection of the ideas in this section is the reference to the πειρασμοί which Christians have to endure. Several expositors have assumed this reference in the idea ταπεινός; thus, among moderns, Theile, whilst to the explanation of Morus: carens fortunis externis omninoque calamitosus, he adds: πειρασμῶν περιπεσών, Jam 1:2; δεδιωγμένος ἕνεκεν δικαιοσύνης, Mat 5:10; πάσχων διὰ δικαιοσύνης, 1Pe 3:14; but by this the simple contrast between ταπεινός and πλούσιος is destroyed; for then ὁ πλούσιος must be taken as the rich Christian who had not suffered persecution, which would be evidently meaningless. If, on the other hand, the rich man who shares the lot of persecution with the poor is to be understood (as Laurentius explains it: dives, sc. frater, qui ipse erat una cum paupere fratre in dispersione, direptionem bonorum suorum propter Christi evangelium passus; similarly Erasmus, Hornejus, and others), such a reference is not to be found in the idea ταπεινός in itself; if one puts it into the idea ταπείνωσις, so that by this is to be understood the suffering condition of persecution, in which the πλούσιος is placed, or by which he is threatened (Gebser: “he rejoices in his lowliness, into which he may be brought by persecution”), then there is no reason to find in ταπεινός the idea of poverty expressed. Thus, then, in this view the train of thought, referring it to πειρασμοί, becomes indistinct and confused; and yet this reference is required by the context. But also what directly follows is against the idea of considering the πλούσιος as well as the ταπεινός as a Christian (ἀδελφός); for, apart from the fact that such a rich man would require no such pressing intimation of the perishableness of riches as is contained in the following clauses, it is carefully to be observed that in the words ὅτι … παρελεύσεται, and in Jam 1:11 : οὕτω καὶ κ.τ.λ., the subject is ὁ πλούσιος and not ὁ πλούτος, as that explanation would render necessary; Winer: dives non habet, quo glorietur, nisi ab humilitate sua, nam divitiae mox periturae sunt; so also de Wette, Theile, Wiesinger, and others. This change of the subject is evidently unjustifiable. James says, not of riches, but of the rich man, παρελεύσεται, μαρανθήσεται, which evidently is only valid of the rich man who forms a contrast to ταπεινὸς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. Brückner, in order to avoid the change of subject, explains it of “the rich man according to his external relations;” but this reference is not only arbitrarily introduced, but it weakens the train of thought. That such a bad sense should be given by the author to the idea ὁ πλούσιος, is evident both from chap. Jam 2:6-7, where he represents the πλούσιοι as the persecutors of the Christians, and from chap. Jam 5:1-6, where they are threatened with condemnation; besides, the word is elsewhere used in the sacred Scriptures in a bad sense; comp. Luk 6:24-26; Isa 53:9, where עָשִׂיר is parallel with רשׁעִים; Sir 13:3 : πλούσιος ἠδίκησε … πτωχὸς ἠδίκηται; Sir 17:18 : τί κοινωνήσει λύκος ἀμνῷ; οὕτως ἁμαρτωλὸς πρὸς εὐσεβῆ … τίς εἰρήνη πλουσίῳ πρὸς πένητα. If ὁ πλούσιος stands in relation of contrast to ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὁ ταπεινός, then the Christian condition cannot be understood by ταπείνωσις, or scarcely with Bouman: animi, nihil sibi arrogantis, modestia; but only the destruction described in the following words: ὄτι κ.τ.λ., into which the rich man on account of his pride has fallen; comp. Luk 6:24-26.[56] The verb to be supplied is neither αἰσχυνέσθω (Oecumenius, Estius, and others) nor ταπεινούσθω, but καυχάσθω (comp. Winer, p. 548 [E. T. 777]). This certainly does not appear suitable, but the expression of James has its peculiar pointedness in this, that the ταπείνωσις, to which the rich man is devoted, is indicated as the only object of his boasting.[57] To this irony (if it be called so)-which already the author of the commentary on the Lamentations in Jerome’s works, and after him Lyra, Thomas, Beza, and others have recognised in our passage-less objection is to be taken, as this was so natural to the deeply moral spirit of James, in opposition to the haughty self-confidence of the rich man opposed to the lowly Christian.
For a more exact explanation of these two verses, the following remarks may suffice. The connection of Jam 1:9 with the preceding is as follows: let the brother of low degree glory amid his temptations in his exaltation (Gunkel). The idea καυχᾶσθαι is neither exhausted by laetari, Ἀ̓ΓΑΛΛΙᾶΣΘΑΙ, 1Pe 1:6, Mat 5:12 (Gebser), nor by commemorare, praedicare (Carpzov); it indicates rather glorying, proceeding from the confident assurance of superiority; Theile: notio gloriandi involvit notas 1 gaudendi, 2 confidentiae, 3 externe expressi.
Ὁ ἈΔΕΛΦΌς, according to the above explanation, refers only to Ὁ ΤΑΠΕΙΝΌς, not to Ὁ ΠΛΟΎΣΙΟς, which rather forms the contrast set over against that idea. By Ὁ ΤΑΠΕΙΝΌς is not indicated a kind of ἈΔΕΛΦΟΊ, but is the characteristic mark of true Christians. It is incorrect to take ΤΑΠΕΙΝΌς here as entirely equivalent to ΠΤῶΧΟς; it goes beyond the idea of ΠΤῶΧΟς, indicating the Christian according to his entire lowly condition in the world, which also is not inapplicable to him who is perhaps rich in worldly wealth, especially as these riches have no true value for him. Comp. moreover, 1Co 1:26 : Οὐ ΠΟΛΛΟῚ ΔΥΝΑΤΟΊ, Οὐ ΠΟΛΛΟῚ ΕὐΓΕΝΕῖς. ΤΑΠΕΙΝΌς is the Christian, in so far as he is despised and persecuted by the world (ΤΕΤΑΠΕΙΝΩΜΈΝΟς ΚΑῚ ΚΑΤΗΣΧΥΜΜΈΝΟς, Psa 74:21, comp. 1Co 1:27), is inwardly distressed (ἘΝ ΠΑΝΤῚ ΘΛΙΒΌΜΕΝΟς, ἜΞΩΘΕΝ ΜΑΧΑΊ, ἜΣΩΘΕΝ ΦΌΒΟΙ, 2Co 7:5), and walks in humility before God; the opposite of all this is comprehended in ΠΛΟΎΣΙΟς. On ὝΨΟς, Theile rightly remarks: sublimitas … non solum jam praesens sed etiam adhuc futura cogitari potest = ΖΩΉ illa, quae in coelis perficienda in terris jam est. Incorrectly, de Wette understands by this “present exaltation;” as little also does ὝΨΟς indicate only “the stedfast courage of the Christian” (Augusti); and still less is it equivalent to divitiae, as Pott thinks, who finds only the thought here expressed: Ὁ ΤΑΠΕΙΝΌς dives sibi videatur.
By ἘΝ is not to be understood the condition in which (Schneckenburger), but, according to the prevailing linguistic usage of the N. T., the object upon which the glorying is to take place; comp. Rom 5:3.
The words ὅτι ὡς ἄνθας χόρτου παρελεύσεται announce wherein the ΤΑΠΕΊΝΩΣΙς of the rich consists. As regards the construction, it forms one simple sentence. Baumgarten incorrectly construes ΠΑΡΕΛΕΎΣΕΤΑΙ with Ὁ ΠΛΟΎΣΙΟς, and considers ὍΤΙ Ὡς ἌΝΘΟς ΧΌΡΤΟΥ, sc. ἐστι, as a parenthesis, by which an epigrammatic sharpness is conveyed to the preceding sentence. The figure, which is further drawn out in Jam 1:11, is of frequent occurrence in the O. T., whilst with the quickly fading grass and its flower is not only man generally (comp. Job 14:2 : ὭΣΠΕΡ ἌΝΘΟς ἈΝΘῆΣΑΝ ἘΞΈΠΕΣΕΝ; Psa 103:15 : ἌΝΘΡΩΠΟς ὩΣΕῚ ΧΌΡΤΟς … ὩΣΕῚ ἌΝΘΟς ΤΟῦ ἈΓΡΟῦ ΟὝΤΩς ἘΞΑΝΘΉΣΕΙ; Isa 40:6-7 : ΠᾶΣΑ ΣᾺΡΞ ΧΌΡΤΟς, ΚΑῚ ΠᾶΣΑ ΔΌΞΑ ἈΝΘΡΏΠΩΝ Ὡς ἌΝΘΟς ΧΌΡΤΟΥ· ἘΞΗΡΆΝΘΗ Ὁ ΧΌΡΤΟς ΚΑῚ ΤῸ ἌΝΘΟς ἘΞΈΠΕΣΕ; comp. 1Pe 1:24), but also specially, as here the ungodly[58] (comp. Psa 37:2 : ὩΣΕῚ ΧΌΡΤΟς ΤΑΧῪ ἈΠΟΞΗΡΑΝΘΉΣΟΝΤΑΙ, ΚΑῚ ὩΣΕῚ ΛΆΧΑΝΑ ΧΛΌΗς ΤΑΧῪ ἈΠΟΠΕΣΟῦΝΤΑΙ; see also Psa 90:6), compared.
ἌΝΘΟς is here, not as in Isa 11:1, LXX. translation of נֵצֶּר = germen, surculus (Hottinger), but the flower; however, the combination צִיץ חָצִיֹר is not found in Hebrew; in Isa 40:7 it is צִיץ הַשָׂדֶה. Παρέρχεσθαι, in the meaning of destruction, often occurs in the N. T. (so also in the Hebrew עָבַר); also in the classics: Soph. Trach. 69: ΤῸΝ ΠΑΡΕΛΘΌΝΤʼ ἌΡΟΤΟΝ.
[56] According to Lange, the expressions ὁ ταπεινός and ὁ πλούσιος are to be taken in a prophetico-symbolical sense, so that the first “designates the Jewish Christian and the Jew absolutely in their low oppressed theocratic condition as contrasted with the heathen world and the secular power, or still more exactly the theocrat, inasmuch as he deeply feels his condition;” the second, “again, designates the Jew and the Jewish Christian, inasmuch as he sees the hopeless situation of the Jewish people in a brilliant light, inasmuch as he is not only rich in the consciousness of his Jewish prerogatives, but also in chiliastic and visionary expectation,” etc. This interpretation requires no refutation.
[57] A similar connection is found in Php 3:19 : ἡ δόξα ἐν τῇ αἰσχύνῃ αὐτῶν.
[58] Lange observes: “This is not here the image of the ungodly, but is to be understood as a historical figure with reference to the decay of the O. T. glory!”
Jam 1:11. A further expansion of the image. The aorists ἀνέτειλε, ἐξήρανε, etc., do not precisely stand for the present (Grotius, Piscator, Hottinger, and others), but represent the occurrence in a concrete manner as a fact which has taken place, by which the description gains in vividness (comp. Isa 40:7), which is still more vividly portrayed by the simple succession of finite verbs. See Winer, p. 248 [E. T. 346, 347] and p. 417 [E. T. 590]; A. Buttmann, p. 175. It is only confusing to convert ἀνέτειλε … ἐξήρανε into ἀνατείλας or ἐὰν ἀνατέλλῃ … ἐξήρανε.
By the word καύσων is often in the LXX. (comp. besides Eze 17:10; Eze 19:12, Hos 13:15 : Jer 18:17; Jon 4:8; where ἄνεμος or πνεῦμα is added, particularly Job 27:21; Hos 12:1) meant the hot east wind (קָדִים), which, blowing over the steppes of Arabia, is very dry and scorching to vegetation (see Winer’s Reallexicon: word, Wind); here, however, as in Isa 49:10 (שָׁדָב closely united with שֶׁמֶשׁ), Sir 18:16 (comp. also Sir 43:3, where it is said of the sun: καὶ ἐναντίον καύματος αὐτοῦ τίς ὑποστήσεται), Mat 20:12, Luk 12:55, it has the meaning “heat, burning” (against Grotius, Pott, Hottinger, Kern, Schneckenburger, Winer, Wahl, Lange, Bouman, and others), as the parching effect is attributed not to the καύσων as something different from the sun, but to the sun itself.[59] It is arbitrary to explain it as if it were written: ἨΓΈΡΘΗ ΓΆΡ, ἍΜΑ Τᾷ ἈΝΑΤΕῖΛΑΙ ΤῸΝ ἭΛΙΟΝ, Ὁ ΚΑΎΣΩΝ; as Gebser says: “the burning wind rising with the sun is the image.” Laurentius incorrectly understands by the sun “Christ,” and by the rising of the sun “the day of the Lord;” thus the whole is an image of the judgment destroying the rich, yet so that the individual parts are to be retained in their appropriate meaning.[60]
ΚΑῚ ἘΞΉΡΑΝΕ Κ.Τ.Λ.] The same expressions in Isa 40:7.
ἘΚΠΊΠΤΕΙΝ, i.e. not simply the withering (Isa 28:1; Isa 28:4, LXX.), but the actual falling off of the flower, is a consequence of the blighting of the plant.
ἡ εὐπρέπεια] the opposite of ἈΠΡΈΠΕΙΑ is used in the classics chiefly of external appearance; in the N. T. it is an ἍΠ. ΛΕΓ.
ΤῸ ΠΡΌΣΩΠΟΝ = פָּנִים, Psa 104:30; comp. Luk 12:56; Mat 16:3 : species externa. ΑὐΤΟῦ refers, not as the first ΑὐΤΟῦ, to ΤῸΝ ΧΌΡΤΟΝ, but ΤῸ ἌΝΘΟς, on which the emphasis rests (comp. Jam 1:10, de Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman).[61]
ΟὝΤΩ] thus quickly, thus entirely (Wiesinger); ΚΑΊ is not purely superfluous (Wiesinger), but, referring back to the image, heightens the comparison.
Ὁ ΠΛΟΎΣΙΟς … ΜΑΡΑΝΘΉΣΕΤΑΙ] It is to be observed that here also Ὁ ΠΛΟΎΣΙΟς and not Ὁ ΠΛΟῦΤΟς is the subject. ΜΑΡΑΊΝΕΣΘΑΙ, in the N. T. an ἍΠ. ΛΕΓ., is found in the LXX. as the translation of יָבֵשׁ, Job 15:30; in the same meaning in the Wisdom of Solomon Jam 2:8. The figurative expression is explained by what goes before.
ἘΝ ΤΑῖς ΠΟΡΕΊΑΙς ΑὙΤΟῦ] not “on his journeys” (Laurentius, Piscator, Herder), also not “on his journeyings of fortune” (Lange); but = ἘΝ ΤΑῖς ὍΔΟΙς ΑὐΤΟῦ, Jam 1:8 (comp. Pro 2:8, LXX.). The prominent idea is that the rich man, overtaken by judgment, perishes in the midst of his doings and pursuits, as the flower in the midst of its blossoming falleth a victim to the scorching heat of the sun. Luther’s translation: “in his possession,” is explained from the false reading ΠΟΡΊΑΙς. See critical notes.
[59] Neither the article before καύσωνι, nor the observation that “with the rising of the sun and the development of its heat the vegetation is not forthwith imperilled,” forms a valid reason against this explanation (against Lange).
[60] That “with the sun of a finished revelation was developing the hot wind of the law, which scorched the glory of Israel” (Lange), is a remark which is here the more inappropriate, as according to it the sun and the hot wind are indicated as two different powers opposed to each other.
[61] Lange, on the other hand, observes “that a fallen flower is still to lose its beauty” cannot be imagined; but is it then to be imagined that the grass when it is withered and the flower has fallen from it is still to lose its beauty?
Jam 1:12. Whilst the rich man is condemned in the judgment, the ἀδελφὸς ὁ ταπεινός, who suffers the πειρασμόν proceeding from the rich man, is blessed. This blessedness forms the conclusion of the series of thought begun at Jam 1:2. To μακάριος ἀνήρ (see Psa 1:1, and frequently in O. T.) not ἔστω, but ἐστί is to be supplied. No special emphasis is to be put on ἀνήρ; comp. Jam 1:8; Jam 1:20; incorrectly Thomas: beatus vir, non mollis vel effoeminatus, sed vir; and not less incorrectly Lange, who explains ἀνήρ here as he does in Jam 1:8. ὂς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν] is not = ὃς πειρασμοῖς περιπίπτει or ὃς πειρασμὸν πάσχει (Hottinger); comp. Jam 1:3; it is the man who does not succumb to the temptations which he has to endure. Laurentius: aliud est ferre crucem, aliud preferre. To supply ὄταν περιπέσῃ (Wiesinger) is unnecessary.
The following sentence beginning with ὅτι adduces the reason of the μακαρισμός: for being approved, he will receive the crown of life. By δόκιμος γενόμενος] is given not so much the condition as the cause, why he that endureth temptation will receive the crown of life; the being approved is the consequence of ὑπομένειν πειρασμόν.
δόκιμος is not, with Krebs, Lösner, Augusti, Pott, and others, to be referred as a figurative expression to the trial preceding the contests of athletes; but if a conscious figurative reference is to be assumed at all (which de Wette, Brückner, and Wiesinger not without reason consider as doubtful), it is to be referred to the purification of metals by fire (Hornejus, Gebser, Schneckenburger, Theile, and others[62]). In ΤῸΝ ΣΤΈΦΑΝΟΝ Τῆς ΖΩῆς] (“not the crown which is peculiar to eternal life, i.e. which is imparted to it,” Gunkel) τῆς ζωῆς is not the genitive of possession (Lange), but of apposition: ΖΩΉ, i.e. the eternal blessed life, is itself the crown of glory with which he that endures is adorned; comp. Rev 2:10; 1Pe 5:4; 2Ti 4:8. It is at least doubtful if there is here any allusion to the reward of the victor in the Greek games,-which is maintained by Zwingli, Michaelis, Hensler, Pott, de Wette, Wiesinger, and others, and contested by Semler, Augusti, Schneckenburger, Hottinger, Theile, Brückner, and others,-as even among the Jews, without any reference to a contest, a crown or diadem is regarded as the symbol of peculiar honour; comp. besides Psa 21:4 (Brückner), especially Wisdom of Solomon Jam 5:16, 17: δίκαιοι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ζῶσι … λήψονται τὸ βασίλειον τῆς εὐπρεπείας καὶ τὸ διάδημα τοῦ κάλλους ἐκ χειρὸς κυρίου; with Paul, on the other hand, such an allusion frequently occurs. The certainty of receiving this crown of glory is founded on the divine promise: ὋΝ ἘΠΗΓΓΕΊΛΑΤΟ (Ὁ ΚΎΡΙΟς) ΤΟῖς ἈΓΑΠῶΣΙΝ ΑὐΤΌΝ] If Ὁ ΚΎΡΙΟς is the correct reading, we are to understand not Christ (Baumgarten, Schneckenburger), but God (Gebser, Theile, Wiesinger).
The expression ΤΟῖς ἈΓΑΠῶΣΙΝ ΑὐΤΌΝ (comp. Psa 97:10; Psa 145:20; Rom 8:28, etc.) intimates that ὙΠΟΜΈΝΕΙΝ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΌΝ is a proof and testimony of love to God, and is accordingly a proof how careful James was to designate love as the essence of true faith (so also Lange); therefore the repetition of the same addition in chap. Jam 2:5. On the whole passage, comp. particularly 2Ti 4:8.
[62] Lange asserts that this figurative reference is so far incorrect, as “that figure presupposes the idea of refining, which, although contained in the trial or proof, is not identical with it;” but the identity is not maintained.
Jam 1:13. To ὃς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν James opposes ὃς πειράζεται;[63] whilst the former gains ΖΩΉ, the end to which the latter approaches is ΘΆΝΑΤΟς (Jam 1:15).
First James disclaims a vain justification of the latter, and then describes the process of ΠΕΙΡΆΖΕΣΘΑΙ. The vain justification is introduced with the direct words of the ΠΕΙΡΑΖΌΜΕΝΟς: ὍΤΙ ἈΠῸ ΘΕΟῦ ΠΕΙΡΆΖΟΜΑΙ, and then disclaimed by the expression: Ὁ ΘΕῸς ἈΠΕΙΡΑΣΤΌς ἘΣΤΙ ΚΑΚῶΝ Κ.Τ.Λ.
By the direct transition from the preceding to this verse, it is supposed that by the ΠΕΙΡΑΖΌΜΕΝΟς spoken about, in contrast to Ὃς ὙΠΟΜΈΝΕΙ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΌΝ (Jam 1:12), is to be understood the person who does not endure the temptation, and consequently is not proved by it, but who succumbs under it, whilst he suffers himself to be enticed to falling away-to sin. Pott: qui tentatione vincitur, ad peccandum vincitur; Theile: agit Jacobus de turpi tentatione per tristem (tentationem); so also Olshausen, Schneckenburger, Kern, and others. This connection is denied by others; thus Calvin says: de alio tentationes genere disserit; and Wiesinger in the strongest manner: “this appears as the design of the apostle: to distinguish as much as possible those πειρασμοῦς and this ΠΕΙΡΆΖΕΣΘΑΙ, to place the latter as totally different from the former.” But the close connection with the preceding constrains us to the opinion that James has considered both in reference to each other, the ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΟΊ occasioning the ΠΕΙΡΆΖΕΣΘΑΙ which takes place when ἘΠΙΘΥΜΊΑ is excited by it.[64] It is arbitrary to take the verb πειράζεσθαι in the clause: μηδεὶς πειραζόμενος, in another sense than in the following clause: ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι, as Hottinger asserts: hic verbum πειράζεσθαι bis dicitur sensu diversi; priori loco simpliciter: adversa pati; posteriori: malis sollicitari ad defectionem (similarly Grotius, Semler; also Lange); for, according to this interpretation, the excuse: ὅτι κ.τ.λ., would not correspond to the supposition contained in μηδεὶς πειραζόμενος. In justification of this view, Mat 8:30 cannot be appealed to, where the same word (νεκρόν) is used, in the same sentence in different meanings, namely, in a proper and figurative meaning, as here the relation is entirely different.
Some expositors (Pott, Schneckenburger, and others), without reason, paraphrase λεγέτω by “cogitet, sibi persuadeat.” Since the words which immediately follow are introduced in the direct form, it is better to retain the usual meaning of λέγειν, by which it is in itself evident that the external speaking presupposes an internal, on which it is here natural to think.
James makes the πειραζόμενος thus briefly express the excuse, by which he would justify himself: ὅτι ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι, by which he transfers the guilt from himself to God.[65] ὍΤΙ is the form of quotation frequently occurring in the N. T., except with Paul. ἈΠῸ ΘΕΟῦ is emphatically placed first. ἈΠΌ is not equivalent to ὙΠΌ; the former points to the more distant, the latter to the nearest cause, though by later writers ἈΠΌ with passive verbs is sometimes used as equivalent to ὙΠΌ. Here, however, the usual signification of ἈΠΌ is to be retained, for the ΠΕΙΡΑΖΌΜΕΝΟς, introduced as directly speaking, would certainly not stigmatize God as the direct tempter (comp. Mat 4:1). See Winer, p. 332 [E. T. 464]. James does not with these words refer to any particular doctrine of religion and philosophy, perhaps to the doctrine of the Pharisees and Essenes on εἱμαρμένη (Bull, Ittig, Schneckenburger, and others), or the doctrine of Simon Magus (Calovius), but only considers generally the peculiar bias of the natural man to charge God somehow with the blame of ΠΕΙΡΆΖΕΣΘΑΙ, recognisable in the answer of Adam to the question of God.[66]
James grounds the rejection of the idea contained in μηδεὶς … λεγέτω that the πειράζεσθαι, proceeds from God, by a sentence comprising two members: ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς … οὐδένα. The word ἀπείραστος, an ἅπαξ λεγ. in the N. T., has in classical Greek-in which, however, the form ἀπείρατος (ἀπείρητος) almost always occurs-either the passive meaning untempted, that is, what is not tempted or proved, or the active meaning: he who has made no trial, equivalent to inexperienced. Some expositors take the word in the second meaning; thus Schulthess: in Deum nulla malorum experentia; de Wette, Brückner, and others.[67] But, on account of the close connection with πειράζειν, the word has here, as most expositors assume, an ethical meaning. Yet it is incorrect to explain it actively, with Luther (God is not a tempter to evil; Vulgate: intentator), because this clause would then be tautological with the following. It is rather to be taken passively: untempted of evil, by which the idea passes from tentatus to that of tentabilis; Winer, p. 175 [E. T. 242, 243]. By the Church Fathers God is often named simply ὁ ἀπείραστος; so Ignat. ad Philipp.: τί πειράζεις τὸν ἀπείραστον; Photius, contra Manich. iv. p. 225: πειράζειν ἐπιχειρήσασι τὸν ἀπείραστον. By this predicate the holiness of God, which is raised above all temptation to evil, is indicated, and is the motive likewise to the following thought.[68]
κακῶν is not masculine, but neuter; not misery (Oecumenius), but evil.[69]
πειράζει δὲ αὐτὸς οὐδένα] expresses the consequence of the preceding and the pointed contrast to ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι. πειράζει is placed first for the sake of emphasis. By αὐτός, which most interpreters pass over, is brought forward not God’s action in contrast to “being tempted” (Theile: ipse quoque non tentat idem ille Deus, qui tentari nequit; Wiesinger: “He, self-active;” so also Lange), but shows that the πειράζειν indeed takes place, but from another cause (ἡ ἴδια ἐπιθυμία) than from God. The meaning of the whole verse is as follows: Let no man, when he is tempted (inwardly enticed) to evil, say, From God I am tempted: for God suffers no temptation; but (δέ) as to the temptation, He (God) tempteth no man: but every man is tempted, etc.[70] As regards the apparent contradiction of this with other passages of the Holy Scriptures, where the sins of men are referred to God as their reason (Gen 22:1; Deu 8:2, etc.), Calvin correctly remarks: Quum Scriptura excoecationem vel obdurationem cordis tribuit Deo, neque illi initium assignat, neque facit mali auctorem, ut culpam sustinere debeat. In his autem duobus solum Jacobus insistit.
[63] When Lange meets this with the question: “How could any one endure the temptation without having first been tempted?” he only shows that he does not understand the explanation here given.
[64] It is to be observed that James designates the trials, on which he thinks in ὅταν πειρασμοῖς περιπίσητι, ver. 3, as πειρασμοί. It may be said that they are not this in themselves, but only in so far as the Christian is yet a sinner, and can thus be enticed by them into sin; when this happens, then the πειράζεσθαι, of which James here speaks, takes place. Stier: “That there is a necessity for our all being tested and approved through, trial, springs from our sin; the tempting element in our trial, the evil in it, springs therefore from that and not from God.”
[65] He might find a justification of this in the fact that πειρασμοί actually spring from God. See Meyer on Mat 6:13, and on 1Co 10:13. Lange introduces inappropriate matter, maintaining in favour of the concrete relations supposed by him, that the Jews and Judaizing Christians with this word would justify their fanaticism against the Gentiles, particularly their separation from the Gentile Christians, as an affair of God (for His glory)!
[66] Many expressions in Greek authors show how natural this is to man; comp. Il. τ. 86: ἰγώ δʼ οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι ἀλλὰ Ζεύς, καὶ μοῖρα; Plaut. Aulul. iv. 10. 7: Deus impulsor mihi fuit; Terent. Eunuch. v. 2. 86: Quid, si hoc voluit quispiam Deus?-Such an excuse suggested itself to the Jews the more as it appeared justified by the language of the O. T. Comp. Exo 20:16. On the contrary, Philo (Quod. deter. pot. 177 D) remarks: οὐ ὡς ἔνιοι τῶν ἀσεβῶν, τὸν Θεὸν αἴτιον τῶν κακῶν φῆσι Μωϋσῆς. Still more fully in Schneckenburger.
[67] Buttmann, p. 148 [E. T. 170], contests this meaning, which rather belongs to the word ἄπειρος. But passages, as Hom. Il. ad Ven. v. 133: ἀδμήτην μʼ ἀγάγων καὶ ἀπειρήτην φιλότητος; Theognis, 772: πολλοὶ ἀπείρητοι δόξαν ἔχουσʼ ἀγαθῶν, show that ἀπείρατος actually has that meaning.
[68] Lange maintains, in reference to the interpretation given above, that in this commentary ἀπείρ. κακ. is explained as equivalent to “God has no experience of evil,” and that it is said that the passive construction: “not tempted,” “not temptable,” is against grammatical usage and the connection! In a very strange manner he thinks it is here designed to strengthen the warning: Let no man say; for this saying, like all fanaticism, was a tempting God, and therefore vain and impious, because God does not suffer Himself to be tempted.
[69] Inapposite uniting of various explanations by Theile and Morus: ἀπείρ. κακ. dicitur, partim quoniam nullae miseriae possunt evenire Deo, partim quoniam per eas non potest inclinari ad peccandum, ad cupiditatem aliquam exercendam; Deus igitur est expers miseriae omnis atque etiam peccati vel pravae cupiditatis, et quia est, neque tentatur a malis ipse, neque alium tentat.
[70] The passage in Sir 15:11-12; Sir 15:20, is especially to be compared: μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι διὰ κύριον ἀπέστην, μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι αὐτός με ἐπλάνησεν. Οὐκ ἐνετείλατο οὐδενὶ ἀσεβεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἔδωκεν ἄνεσιν οὐδενὶ ἁμαρτάνειν. See also 1Co 10:13.
Jam 1:14. That “πειράζεσθαι proceeds not from God,” is the thought of Jam 1:13. Whence comes it then? The answer is given in this verse: “Every man is tempted, when he is drawn out and allured by his own lust.” The words ὑπὸ τῆς ἴδ. ἐπιθυμίας belong not to πειράζεται (Theile, Wiesinger), but to ἐξελκόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος (Luther, Baumgarten, Semler, Knapp, Grashof, Hottinger, de Wette, Brückner, Lange, and others), as otherwise these ideas would drag too much, and would receive their closer reference only by supplying something, as ὑπʼ αὐτῆς (Wiesinger). will describe πειράζεσθαι according to its process; he therefore places the idea first, and then gives in what follows how it occurs, consequently the construction πειράζεται … ἐξελκόμενος requires not to be altered into πειραζόμενος … ἐξελκύεται (Schneckenburger).
πειραζόμενος, as is evident from what goes before, is to be supplied to ἔκαστος; it corresponds to οὐδένα, Jam 1:13. The attribute ἰδίας is emphatic, expressing the contrast to αὐτός in Jam 1:13. It is brought prominently forward because ἐπιθυμία has its ground not in God, but belongs to man.
By ἐπιθυμία is not denoted “innocent sensuousness,” but it occurs here, as everywhere in the N. T. (except where its specific object is named, as in Luk 22:15; Php 1:23; 1Th 2:17), even without the addition of κακή, σαρκική, or some similar adjectives, in sensu malo; yet it is not to be understood as original sin: “the sinful tendency, the same as Paul calls ἁμαρτία in Rom 7:7” (Hofmann, Schriftbew. I. p. 469; Wiesinger); rather ἐπιθυμία here is the same as in Rom 7:7, namely, lust for the forbidden action springing from original sin (which Paul designates as the ἁμαρτία which χωρὶς νόμου is “νεκρά,” but by the commandment revives, and πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν κατεργάζεται). So also Brückner.[71]
James does not here speak of the origin and development of sin in general, but he wishes to mention, in contrast to ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι, by what sinful man is tempted to the definite act of sin, so that he had no occasion to refer to original sin.
With regard to the form of expression, Pott correctly says: ἘΠΙΘΥΜΊΑ, ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ et ΘΆΝΑΤΟς personarum vim habent; imaginem meretricis suppeditant voces ΣΥΛΛΑΒΕῖΝ, ΤΊΚΤΕΙΝ, ἈΠΟΚΎΕΙΝ, nec non et ἘΞΈΛΚΕΙΝ atque ΔΕΛΕΆΖΕΙΝ. The two words ἘΞΈΛΚΕΙΝ and ΔΕΛΕΆΖΕΙΝ sind verba e re venatoria et piscatoria in rem amatoriam et inde in nostrum tropum translata (Schneckenburger); this at least is valid of ΔΕΛΕΆΖΕΙΝ. The meaning: protrahere in littus (Pott, and also de Wette), does not here lie at the root of the idea ἘΞΈΛΚΕΙΝ (ἍΠΑΞ ΛΕΓ. in N. T.), for then it would require to be placed after ΔΕΛΕΆΖΕΙΝ (as also Wieseler, Brückner, and Lange observe); Schulthess more correctly explains it: elicere bestias ex tuto ubi latent in locum hamis retibusque expositum; but it is probable that James had not the original figure so definitely before his eyes. Many interpreters (Menochius, Grotius, Laurentius, Pott, Hottinger, Baumgarten, Theile, and others) supply a bono to ἐξέλκ. and ad malum to δελεάζ., or something similar; yet incorrectly, as the idea is rather that ἘΠΙΘΥΜΊΑ as a harlot entices man, that is, his will, to herself; the ἐξ in ἘΞΈΛΚ. is thus to be explained, that man, enticed by the allurements of ἘΠΙΘΥΜΊΑ, is enticed to forsake his former position (as the place where he remained hitherto concealed); Schneckenburger: statu quasi suo et loco se extrahi et dimoveri ipse patitur. It is incorrect to explain ἘΞΈΛΚΕΙΝ as equivalent to ΠΡΟΣΈΛΚΕΙΝ, or as an intensified form instead of ἝΛΚΕΙΝ.[72] The being taken, captive by ἘΠΙΘΥΜΊΑ is indicated by ΔΕΛΕΑΖΌΜΕΝΟς.[73] δελεάζειν, in the N. T. used here only and in 2Pe 2:2; 2Pe 2:14; 2Pe 2:18, is also among classical writers used figuratively only in sensu malo; comp. particularly, Plato, Tim. lxix. 6: ἡδονὴ μεγίστων κακῶν δέλεαρ; Plut. de ser. Num. Vind.: τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥσπερ δέλεαρ ἐξέλκειν (ἈΝΘΡΏΠΟΥς).
[71] According to Hofmann’s explanation, the form of expression of James would be diametrically opposed to that of Paul; for what Paul calls ἁμαρτία, would call ἐπιθυμία; and what Paul calls ἐπιθυμία, would call ἁμαρτία! And how objectionable is it to say, with Wiesinger: ἐπιθυμία, when stirred up, produces those ἐπιθυμίας σαρκός in Gal 5:16; Gal 5:24, that ἐπιθυμεῖν and that ἐπιθυμία in Rom 7:7-8. It is also incorrect, with Lange, to understand by ἴδια ἐπιθ. “original sin itself in its concrete activity,” or “the folly which the individual encounters externally, over against which the lust belonging to him is objectively placed,” and to determine the same more definitely as the totality of those “glittering, variegated, visionary expectations which seductively met both the Jews and the Jewish Christians, which had sprung from, the matter of the chiliastic, world-lusting, spiritual pride.” James does not here speak of ἑπιθυμία as attacking an individual from outside, but only of that which is within him.
[72] See Athenaeus, i. 3, c. 8: διὰ τὴν ὁμιλίαν τοὺς ἐραστὰς προσελκυσασθαι. Ael. N. An. vi. 31: ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἑλκόμενος.
[73] Lange: “To draw off and to allure-German: Ablocken and Anlocken; the man is first drawn out from his inward self-control and fortress, and then attracted (drawn to) by the allurements of the harlot.”
Jam 1:15. Continuing the image used in Jam 1:14, James in this verse describes what is the fruit which proceeds from δελεάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας: Lust having conceived (i.e. become pregnant) bringeth forth sin, and sin when it is completed bringeth forth death. The object of this representation is not to give a doctrine of sin,-its origin and its end,-but by indicating the fruit of πειράζεσθαι, to demonstrate that it is not from God. By εἶτα the result of πειράζεσθαι, namely τίκτει ἁμαρτίαν, is indicated as directly following upon it; συλλαβοῦσα forms the transition to it, which occurs by ἐπιθυμία taking the will of man captive; it, as it were, becomes pregnant, so that it bears sin.
συλλαβοῦσα τίκτει] corresponds to the Hebrew וַתַּהַר וַתֵּלֶד, which is uniformly in the LXX. translated by συλλαβοῦσα ἔτεκε (Gen 4:5; Gen 4:17; Gen 30:17, and other passages). By ἁμαρτία without the article, the fruit of ἐπιθυμία, according to its quality, is indicated in an entirely general manner. Sin born by lust again carries in itself its own fruit (κύημα), which, having come to completion, (ἀποτελεσθεῖσα), is brought forth out of itself (ἀποκύει). According to de Wette, by ἁμαρτία in the first clause is to be understood “the resolution or internal act,” but in the second clause (ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀποτελεσθεῖσα), “sin accomplished in the external act,” thus acts of sin. This, however, is incorrect, as-(1) by ἡ δὲ ἁμαρτία the ἁμαρτία already mentioned is again taken up, and therefore must have the same meaning; and (2) ἀποτελεῖν ἁμαρτίαν cannot mean “sin accomplished.”[74] Wiesinger, with regard to ΤΊΚΤΕΙ ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑΝ, correctly observes: “ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ is sin, but whether the internal or external act is not stated;” yet ἈΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΘΕῖΣΑ added in the following clause shows that James considered ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ as something gradually developed, for ἈΠΟΤΕΛΕῖΝ is not equivalent to ΤΊΚΤΕΙΝ (so that ἈΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΘΕῖΣΑ would be = ΤΕΧΘΕῖΣΑ, Baumgarten: “sin brought or produced into the world in such a manner”), but completed: thus ἡ ἁμ. ἀποτ.=“sin which has attained to its complete development.” It is not entirely corresponding to the idea of James when Calvin (with whom most recent critics
Kern, Schneckenburger, Theile, Wiesinger, and others-agree) explains it as “the entire sinful life” (non unum aliquod opus perpetratum, sed cursus peccandi completus; vita impia et scelerata). As James considers ἁμαρτία itself personified, it is ἈΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΘΕῖΣΑ when it has grown to such fulness of power that it rules man’s whole life. According to this idea, it is indeed correct when several interpreters explain ἈΠΟΤΕΛ. by adulta; thus Bouman: peccatum, quum ad adultam pervenit aetatem; yet, linguistically, this explanation is not to be justified, as ἈΠΟΤΕΛΕῖΣΘΑΙ is not equivalent to adolescere. The explanation given in the earlier edition of this commentary, that by ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ is meant the act of sin, is erroneous, because such a limitation of the general idea is not indicated; on this account it is not correct to think on ἐπιθυμία and ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ as a single definite lust and sin.
Brückner considers the addition of ἈΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΘΕῖΣΑ is made only “in order that ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ, which was at first represented as a child, might again be represented as a mother.” This, however, is incorrect; the origin and growth (or, more correctly, the completion) of sin by no means occur “in reality together at one moment;” sin bears death, which it carried in itself at the first, only when it is not interrupted in its development by a higher life-power, but has attained to its complete form.
By θάνατος, by which James indicates the fruit of completed sin according to its nature, is to be understood, not only temporary death (Pott: homines peccando mortales factos esse omnes consentiunt N. T. scriptores), but, as the opposite of the ζωή which God has promised, and will give to them who love Him, eternal death; see Rom 6:23 : τὰ ὀψώνια τῆς ἁμαρτίας, θάνατος· τὸ δὲ χάρισμα Θεοῦ, ζωὴ αἰώνιος. If, therefore, nothing but ΘΆΝΑΤΟς is the end to which ΠΕΙΡΆΖΕΣΘΑΙ conducts, this cannot possibly have its reason in God, who works ΖΩΉ, and therefore it is absurd to say ἈΠῸ ΘΕΟῦ ΠΕΙΡΆΖΟΜΑΙ (Jam 1:13).
The expression ἈΠΟΚΎΕΙ (only here and in Jam 1:18 in the N. T.) is distinguished from ΤΊΚΤΕΙ only in this, that it indicates more definitely that ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ from the beginning is pregnant with ΘΆΝΑΤΟς. By the explanation: meretur mortem (Bede, Laurentius, and others), a relation is introduced foreign to the context. On the mode of writing ἈΠΟΚΥΕῖ and ἈΠΟΚΎΕΙ, see Winer, p. 80 [E. T. 107]; Schirlitz, p. 184 f.
[74] De Wette incorrectly appeals to the expression ἀποτελεῖν ἐπιθυμίαν in Plato, Gorg. p. 503 D, and τελεῖν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, as there ἐπιθυμία and ἁμαρτία are not similar, but different ideas. When Wiesinger, against the explanation of de Wette, says that συλλαβοῦσα indicates that “the will consents to the demand of the desire, which is the resolution or internal act,” it is, on the contrary, to be observed that these two are by no means identical, as the resolution is an act of the will, and thus is actually sin, whilst by συλλαβοῦσα is indicated a point preceding τίκτειν ἁμαρτιαν.
Jam 1:16 introduces the statement which follows as one particularly important. Not only the exhortation: μὴ πλανᾶσθε, but also the added address: ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί, shows how important this observation appeared to the author. A new line of thought, unconnected with the preceding, does not indeed begin with this verse; μὴ πλανᾶσθε must not therefore be considered, with Hornejus, Gebser, and others, only as the concluding formula to what goes before. Theile correctly observes: ubi antecedentia respicit, nunquam finit cohortationem, sed ita interpositum est, ut continuet ac firmet, nunc illustrando, nunc cavendo. The same formula is found in 1Co 6:9; 1Co 15:33; Gal 6:7 (similarly 1Jn 3:7); in all those places it precedes a thought certain to the Christian conscience, by which a preceding expression is confirmed in opposition to a false opinion: this is also the case here. Grotius inserts an entirely foreign reference when he says: hoc vult: ne putate vestrum studium sufficere sine precibus; see Luk 18:1. There is here no reference whatever to prayer.
Jam 1:17. The sentiment in this verse, introduced by Jam 1:16, is designed for the complete rejection of ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι; the good comes from God, therefore πειράζεσθαι cannot come from God. The idea of the good is indicated by two synonymous expressions: δόσις ἀγαθή and δώρημα τέλειον. By δόσις, which has here not an active, as in Php 4:5 (Bouman, Lange), but a passive signification (as frequently in classical Greek and in the Apocrypha), and by δώρημα, the same thing is indicated-in contrast to ἰδία ἐπιθυμία, Jam 1:14-as something given and presented, which thus proceeds not from man himself. By δώρημα τέλειον the idea already contained in δόσις ἀγαθή is heightened, δώρημα more definitely indicating the gift (δόσις) as a free present (which Gunkel incorrectly denies; see Rom 5:16, where δώρημα is parallel with χάρισμα), and τέλειον the idea of the good (ἀγαθή) as morally perfect[75] It is arbitrary to refer the two expressions to different gifts, and by δόσις to understand the gifts of the kingdom of nature or of the present life, and by ΔΏΡΗΜΑ those of the kingdom of grace or of the future life. Also ἈΓΑΘΉ is not, with Didymus, to be restricted to the idea of the useful. Several interpreters (Raphelius, Stolz, Rosenmüller, Bengel, Augusti, Pott, Hottinger, and others) put an exclusive force on Πᾶς, as if it were = non nisi, “nothing but;” but the thought is weakened thereby. James designs to say not only-in contrast to the derivation of πειράζεσθαι from God-that only good (thus not evil) gifts come from Him, but likewise that good gifts all come only from God (thus from none else) (Stier); πᾶς is accordingly to be taken in its usual meaning; but ἈΓΑΘΉ and ΤΈΛΕΙΟΝ are to be emphasized. Schneckenburger arbitrarily explains it as if James had written: ΠᾶΣΑ ΔΌΣΙς ΚΑῚ ΠᾶΝ ΔΏΡΗΜΑ ἌΝΩΘΕΝ ΚΑΤΑΒΑῖΝΟΝ ΤΈΛΕΙΌΝ ἘΣΤΙ.[76]
ἄνωθεν] = οὐράνοθεν (Act 14:17; Act 26:13; ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, Joh 6:32-33), is put first for the sake of emphasis.
ἐστι καταβαῖνον] are not, with Wolf, Bengel, Kern, Bouman, and others, to be separated, so that ἐστι is to be joined to ἄνωθεν, and καταβαῖνον is added as an epexegesis; but to be united, and are put instead of καταβαίνει, only that by the participle the quality of the verbal idea is more brought out; see chap. Jam 3:15; so also Wiesinger and A. Buttmann, p. 266 [E. T. 310]; Winer, p. 311 [E. T. 438], and Schirlitz, p. 317, on the other hand, regard the expression as entirely equivalent to καταβαίνει.
The expression καταβαῖνον is explained from ἄνωθεν. The explanation of Laurentius: non cadens, sed descendens, quia ordinarie bona sua dona dat, is far-fetched.
ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώτων] an epexegesis to the preceding. By τὰ φῶτα is to be understood neither spiritual light, whether knowledge (Hornejus), or joy (Michaelis), or goodness, wisdom (Wolf: omnis perfectio, bonitas, sapientia et prosperitas), or something similar, nor the spirits of light (Schol. ap. Matt.: ἤτοι τῶν ἀγγελικῶν δυνάμεων· ἢ τῶν πεφωτισμένων ἀνθρώπων; Lange: “the whole series of organs of revelation from Abraham to Christ, as the representatives of all good spirits”). Nor is there here any allusion to the Urim and Thummim of the high priest (Heisen); but by it are meant, as almost all modern expositors recognise, the heavenly bodies (see LXX. Psalms 135 :(136)7; Jer 4:23) = φωστῆρες, LXX. Gen 1:14. God is designated as the πατήρ of these, because He is their Creator and Preserver. This designation, for which Job 38:28 cannot be appealed to, is surprising, as it is without analogy either in the O. or N. T. (otherwise with profane writers and Philo). It has, however, its ground in this, that James considers the light of the heavenly bodies as a reflection of the essential light of God. Since God is the Father of light, the symbol of the holy ones (Wiesinger), so He Himself must be light, and thus nothing dark (consequently not πειράζεσθαι), but rather only all that is light, can proceed from Him. As the Father of lights, God, however, outshines these: their light is changing; His, on the contrary, is without change. The following words: with whom there is no variation nor shadow (in consequence) of change, express this idea; i.e., whilst with the stars a παραλλαγή or τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα occurs, there is nothing similar to this with God.[77] According to Grotius, with whom various expositors agree, these expressions are termini technici of astronomy. But, in opposition to this, it is to be observed that παραλλαγή never occurs as an astronomical term (see Gebser in loco), and the astronomical signification of τροπή = solstitium, solstice (ΤΡΟΠΑῚ ΘΕΡΙΝΑΊ and ΧΕΙΜΕΡΙΝΑΊ; comp. Wis 7:18 : ΤΡΟΠῶΝ ἈΛΛΑΓΆς), is not here suitable, as the sun is not mentioned specially, nor is an ἈΠΟΣΚΊΑΣΜΑ effected by the solstice. James here uses not the language of astronomy, but that of ordinary life (Wiesinger).
ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΉ is to be understood quite generally, variation. James adds to this general idea, in order to bring prominently forward that the essential light of God is not, as is the case with the stars, obscured by anything, the more definite idea τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα. ἀποσκίασμα has not an active (de Wette: “casting a shadow”), but a passive signification, being shaded (so Brückner); and τροπῆς assigns the reason (ἈΠΟΣΚΊΑΣΜΑ quae oritur e ΤΡΟΠῇ, Schneckenburger): thus the shadowing of the stars, which is effected by their changeable position:[78] for that James has founded his idea in a change in the stars themselves is not probable.[79] Luther’s translation: “the change of light and darkness” (similarly Stolz: “changing obscuration”), is only justified if it were said ΤΡΟΠῊ ἈΠΟΣΚΙΆΣΜΑΤΟς. Deviating entirely from the above explanation, the Greek interpreters take ἈΠΟΣΚΊΑΣΜΑ = ἼΧΝΟς; Oecumenius: ἈΝΤῚ ΤΟῦ· ΟὐΔῈ ΜΈΧΡΙς ὙΠΟΝΟΊΑς ΤΙΝῸς ὙΠΟΒΟΛΉ; Suidas: ἈΝΤῚ ΤΟῦ· ἈΛΛΟΙΏΣΕΩς ΚΑῚ ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛῆς ἼΧΝΟς· ΚΑῚ ὉΜΟΊΩΜΑ ΦΑΝΤΑΣΊΑς; and following them several recent writers; Morus: ne tantillum mutationes; Rosenmüller: no shadow of change; so Hensler and others. But in this signification ἈΠΟΣΚΊΑΣΜΑ never elsewhere occurs; also the here essential idea of obscuration (Bengel: ἀποσκίασμα, opponitur luminibus) would be lost.
The form ἔνΙ (besides here in the N. T. in 1Co 6:5; Gal 3:28; Col 3:11) is not, with Buttmann, II. 375; Winer, p. 74 [E. T. 96]; Schirlitz, 171, and others, to be taken as a peculiar form of ἘΝ, but is the abbreviation of ἜΝΕΣΤΙ (A. Buttmann, p. 64 [E. T. 72]); comp. 1Co 6:5 : ΟὐΚ ἜΝΙ ἘΝ ὙΜῖΝ ΣΟΦῸς ΟὐΔῈ ΕἾς (see Meyer in loco). ἔνι, however, is not, with Pott, to be explained as precisely equivalent with ἘΣΤΙΝ, yet the meaning of the preposition ἘΝ is so weakened, as the verb could be construed with any other preposition, as here with the preposition ΠΑΡΆ, which here, as frequently in the N. T., stands for “what spiritually belongs to another, is in another’s possession;” Demosthenes, de cor. p. 318, 13: εἰ δʼ οὖν ἐστι καὶ παρʼ ἐμοί τις ἐμπειρία τοιαύτη.
[75] Whilst de Wette finds the emphasis only in the adjectives, Theile correctly remarks: Et substantiva et adjectiva differunt ita, ut posterius priore sit definitius ideoque majus. So also Wiesinger and Brückner. Lange by δώρ. τέλ. understands “the gift of God completed in Christianity;” and by δόσ. ἀγ. “everything which served to prepare this completed gift, especially in the old covenant.”
[76] On the accidental hexameter which the words πᾶσα … τέλειον form, see Winer, p. 564 [E. T. 798].
[77] Flatt (Spicil. observatt. ad ep. Jacobi): Auctor siderum nitidorum ipsis etiam nitidior et nitoris, nullis unquam tenebris interrupti, majori constantia fulgens. Similarly it is said of Wisdom: ἔστι γὰρ αὕτη εὐπρεπεστέρα ἡλίου, καὶ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν ἄστρων θέσιν, φωτὶ συγκρινομένη εὑρίσκεται προτέρα, Wis 7:29.
[78] Incorrectly Lange explains the expression: “of the obscuration of the earth effected by the diurnal phenomenal revolution of the sun, moon, and stars.” And the proper idea which James has in view is, according to Lange, that God “makes no revolution with the Old Testament which would cast a night-shadow on the New, nor does He suffer the New Testament to cast a night-shadow on the Old!!”
[79] Without reason, Baumgarten, Schneckenburger, and others assume that James here alludes to the astrological superstitions of the Jews.
Jam 1:18. Most interpreters subordinate the thought contained in this verse to the preceding, regarding it either as an example (Laurentius: loquitur Ap. in his verbis de generatione spirituali ut sit quasi exemplum aliquod istorum donorum spiritualium, quae sunt desuper) or as a confirmation and a proof (thus Gebser, Kern, Wiesinger, Bouman; also Lange[80]); on the contrary, according to Theile and de Wette,[81] its relation is that of co-ordination. But in both explanations the peculiar significance which this verse has in the context is mistaken. It is to be recognised as a principal thought, not only because the succeeding exhortations flow from it, but also because the preceding development only comes to its close in it; whilst only in βουληθεὶς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς is not only the assertion ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι completely refuted, but also all the earlier mentioned assertions have their sure foundation. It is accordingly not a confirmation of Jam 1:17, but rather a special inference from the general idea of that verse.
βουληθεὶς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς] The verb itself testifies that here the discourse is of the new birth, and not of natural birth, for ἀποκύειν is Synonymous with γεννᾷν; but the man γεγεννημένος ἐκ Θεοῦ (1Jn 3:9; see also 1Pe 1:23) is not man in himself, but man born again. Unsatisfactorily Pott explains ἀποκύειν = facere, efficere, since by this the specific idea of the verb, that the foundation of the life of him who is born again lies in God, and that he is θείας φύσεως κοινωνός (2Pe 1:4), is lost.
ἡμᾶς] not us as men, nor us as Jewish Christians, but us as Christians.
The verse emphatically commences with βουληθείς, by which is expressed not a contrast to the merit of human works (Bede: non nostris, sed beneficio suae voluntatis; similarly Calvin, Hornejus, Grotius, etc.), nor to “the Jewish claims of righteousness” (Lange), but it is designed prominently to bring forward the thought that the new birth rests on the divine will-the work is that which God has peculiarly willed. But if this be the case, how can πειράζεσθαι proceed from Him? Without sufficient reason, Bengel, Kern, Schneckenburger, Wiesinger, and others put the additional idea of love in βουληθείς.[82]
ΛΌΓῼ ἈΛΗΘΕΊΑς] The instrument of ἈΠΟΚΥῆΣΑΙ is the ΛΟΓΟς ἈΛΗΘΕΊΑς, that is, the gospel,[83] which is so called because “ἈΛΗΘΕΊΑ in its entire reality is inherent in it” (Harless on Eph 1:13). The words: ΕἸς ΤῸ ΕἾΝΑΙ ἩΜᾶς ἈΠΑΡΧΉΝ ΤΙΝΑ ΤῶΝ ΑὙΤΟῦ ΚΤΙΣΜΆΤΩΝ] express the aim of this new birth, by which is not indicated what Christians, as those who are born of God, ought to become, but what they are, according to the intention of God.[84] By τινα added to ἈΠΑΡΧΉΝ the mode of expression is indicated as figurative, for, as Calvin correctly remarks, ΤΙΝΑ similitudinis est nota, nos quodammodo esse primitias (so also Gebser, Hottinger, Kern, Wiesinger, and others). Also Bengel recognises this, but he puts therein a false reference, observing: quaedam habet modestiam, nam primitiae proprie et absolute est Christus. Still more incorrect is it, with Lange, to explain τινα, that James considered the angels of God as a different kind of first-fruits of creation. Laurentius correctly says: ἈΠΑΡΧΉ allusio est ad ritum legalem in Vetum Testamentum de consecratione primogenitorum, frugum, jumentorum et hominum (so also Calvin, Hornejus, Wiesinger, and others; unsatisfactorily de Wette: “chosen and holy”). The word has here, as everywhere in the O. T., and predominantly among the classics, a religious signification, namely, “the first-fruits dedicated to God;” so that James by this expression indicates Christians, as a fruit dedicated to the service of God. But ἡμᾶς emphatically repeated shows that James does not here state the nature of Christians generally, but what the position is which he and those Christians occupy who, according to Rom 8:23, possess ΤῊΝ ἈΠΑΡΧῊΝ ΤΟῦ ΠΝΕΎΜΑΤΟς (see Meyer in loco). They are a kind of first-fruits of God’s creatures, because they, as being born of God, are dedicated to God first among all His creatures. The glorification, which is destined for the whole world, was first imparted to Christians then living.[85] In the N. T. ἀπαρχή is sometimes so used that the religious signification steps into the background (thus in 1Co 15:20; 1Co 15:23; Rom 8:23; Rom 16:5; 1Co 16:15; otherwise in Rom 11:16 and Rev 14:5); and accordingly several expositors explain the expression of James as equivalent to οἱ πρῶτοι τῶν κτισμάτων αὑτοῦ. But against this is, on the one hand, the added τινα, and on the other hand, the existing necessity of conceiving as added to κτισμάτων an attribute, as νέων or καίνων, since the expression τὰ κτίσματα Θεοῦ is not taken by itself, those who are born again, but generally, the creatures of God. It is still more arbitrary to take ἀπαρχή as equivalent to πρῶτοι, in the sense of τιμιώτατοι (Oecumenius; Morus: omnium creaturarum carissimi et dignissimi; the favourites among His creatures), and then to refer the verse to the dignity of man generally, as the Scholiast explains: τὴν ὁρωμένην κτίσιν φησίν, ἧς τιμιώτερον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔδειξεν.[86] By αὑτοῦ (Lachmann and Buttmann, αὐτοῦ; Tischendorf, ἑαυτοῦ), emphatically added, the creatures are indicated as God’s property.
[80] Lange strangely designates the new birth as the effect of the δώρημα τέλειον which came down from heaven.
[81] Theile: Deus, luminum pater, etiam parens est generationis nostrae. De Wette: In place of all good gifts, the gracious gift of the Christian salvation is likewise mentioned as a proof that God can be no tempter.
[82] Bengel: voluntate amantissima. Schneckenburger: non merum volendi actum sed beniguam et benigna voluntate ortam volitionem exprimit. The view of Oecumenius is evidently entirely perverted: τὸ βουληθεὶς εἶπεν, ἐπιστομίζων τοὺς αὐτομάτως ὑποστῆναι τόδε τὸ πᾶν ληροῦντας.
[83] If the want of the article should constrain us to translate λόγος ἀληθείας “a word of truth,” that is, a word whose nature is truth (see Meyer on 2Co 6:7), yet by this word of truth here the gospel can only be understood; but it is more probable that the article is omitted because λόγος ἀληθείας, as an idea definite in itself, did not require the article to designate it.
[84] According to Lange’s supposition, “this teleological mode of expression is chosen in order to indicate that the Jews should become what Christians already are.” This is purely arbitrary, as such a distinction is not indicated in the very slightest degree.
[85] It is, however, also possible that James by ἡμᾶς has had in view, not the distinction between the then existing and the later Christians, but only the distinction between Christians and the other creatures, since Christians of all ages form the ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κτισμάτων, until the commencement of the world’s glorification. Lange with truth brings forward the idea that if Christians are ἀπαρχή, they are sureties for the future glorification of the world; but that the first believers of Israel in their unity are sureties for the future conversion of the nation, is an introduced idea which is not indicated by James.
[86] Thus Schulthess: divino rationis et orationis munere, cujus ex tot animantium generibus atque naturis homo solus est particeps, principatum dignitatis ei datum cernimus.
Jam 1:19. To Jam 1:18 is annexed at first the exhortation to hear, and then in Jam 1:22 the more extended exhortation, not only to be hearers, but also doers of the word. By the reading ὥστε, the connection with the preceding is evidently expressed, ὥστε being with the following imperative, as in 1Co 3:21, Php 2:12 = itaque, therefore. This reading is, however, suspicious, as not only predominant authorities declare for the reading ἴστε, but also ἴστε might be easily changed into ὥστε, in order to mark the thoughts in this verse as an inference from Jam 1:18. It is true the δέ after ἔστω, conjoined with this reading (in B and C), appears to be harsh; but it may be explained from this, that the sentence ἔστω … ταχὺς εἰς τὸ ἀκοῦσαι κ.τ.λ. is introduced as being almost a proverbial expression. The reading of A: ἔστε δὲ … καὶ ἔστω, appears to be a correction, in order to unite this verse more closely with the preceding. ἴστε may be either indicative (comp. Heb 12:17; usually οἴδατε) or imperative; it is at all events to be referred, not to what goes before,[87] but to what follows, as otherwise τοῦτο, or something similar, by which it would be referred back to Jam 1:18, would require to be added. Semler explains it as an indicative, paraphrasing it: non ignoratis istud carmen; Sir 5:11 : γίνου ταχὺς ἐν ἀκροάσει σου κ.τ.λ. As, however, the sentence in question is here expressed in different words, so it is not to be assumed that James would here refer to that passage in Ecclesiasticus. It is thus better to consider ἴστε as an imperative, as it then corresponds to μὴ πλανᾶσθε (Jam 1:16), and serves strongly to impress the following sentence on the readers, in favour of which also is the address ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί, added here as well as there; see also chap. Jam 2:5 : ἀκούσατε, ἀδ. μ. ἀγ.
The sentence is entirely general: let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to wrath. Whilst Laurentius and others consider this as a sententia generalis, which stands in no internal connection with the preceding, but is pressed upon the readers in its entire generality, most interpreters supply to ἀκοῦσαι directly taken from the preceding τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας; thus Estius, Gataker, Gomar, Piscator, Hornejus, Baumgarten, Rosenmüller, Pott, Hottinger, Gebser, de Wette, Wiesinger, and others; but this is arbitrary, particularly as πᾶς ἄνθρωπος points to the universality of the sentence. However, the intention of James is not to inculcate it on his readers in its general sense, but he wishes rather that they, as Christians, should apply it to their Christian conduct; so that for them ἁκοῦσαι certainly refers to λόγος τῆς ἀληθείας (Heisen, Schneckenburger,[88] Theile). ὑμῶν is therefore not to be supplied to πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, still we may say with Semler: pertinet ad Christianos, quatenus sunt Christiani; but the expression is, as part of the general sentence, likewise to be retained in its general meaning; but what holds good of all men, in a peculiar manner holds good of Christians.
The ideas ταχύς and βραδύς, in the N. T. only here (in Luk 24:25, βραδύς has a different meaning), form a direct contrast; as in Philo, de conf. ling. p. 327 B: βραδὺς ὠφελῆσαι, ταχὺς βλάψαι (see Dio O. 32). By βραδὺς εἰς ὀργήν added to the second clause, James announces what kind of speaking he means, namely, speaking ἐξ ὀργῆς.[89] But from Jam 1:20 it is evident that by ὀργή-which, as Cremer correctly remarks, denotes not the passive affection, but active displeasure directed toward any one-is to be understood sinful and passionate zeal. βραδύς is to be taken in both clauses in the same sense, which-as is often the case with expressions in figurative language-goes beyond the literal and direct idea of the word, as Hornejus correctly explains it in reference to the second clause: ita jubet tardos ad iram esse, ut ab eo nos prorsus retrahat. Several expositors refer both clauses, others at least the second chiefly or alone, to the conduct toward God, with or without an express reference to Jam 1:13.[90] But this is incorrect; the ὈΡΓΉ to which James alludes is rather carnal zeal, which will censure its neighbour, whose fruit is not ΕἸΡΉΝΗ, but ἈΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΊΑ (chap. Jam 3:16). The warning is addressed to those Christians who misuse the gospel (the ΛΌΓΟς ἈΛΗΘΕΊΑς) as the Pharisees did the law, not for their own sanctification, but for the gratification of their censoriousness and quarrelsome temper; see chap. 3. Although James with this exhortation has specially in view the conduct of Christians in their assemblies, yet ΛΑΛῆΣΑΙ must not be restricted to the idea of mere teaching (Bede, Hornejus, Hottinger, de Wette, Brückner, and others). λαλῆσαι is a more comprehensive term than ΔΙΔΆΣΚΕΙΝ, which is included in it.
[87] De Wette explains it: “Ye know this, namely, that He has regenerated us;” but this, as he himself confesses, gives a wholly unsatisfactory sense.
[88] Schneckenburger: quamvis de sensu dubitari nequeat, nempe de addiscendo λόγῳ ἀληθείας caveas tamen vocem hanc λόγον putes grammatice subaudiendam; sed Jacobus regulam istam generalem … ita hic subnectit, ut eam ad rem christianam imprimis valere moneat.
[89] The circumstance is in favour of this close connection of these two last clauses, that if λαλῆσαι is here taken in a wider sense (as Gunkel thinks), then a different signification must be given to βραδύς in the two clauses, as ὀργή here, as the following verse shows, must be taken in a bad sense. Lange thinks that James does not absolutely reject ὀργή; but whilst he understands by ὀργή eagerness of passion to which one is led from eagerness in speaking by warmth, he evidently understands this as something to be entirely rejected. According to Bouman, the anger here is meant to which one is inflamed by the λαλεῖν of another.
[90] On βραδ. εἰς τὸ λαλ. Bengel remarks: ut nil loquatur contra Deum, nec sinistre de Deo; and on ὀργή: ira sive impatientia erga Deum, iracundia erga proximum. Gebser explains ὀργή = anger, displeasure at God on account of the persecutions. Calvin also has this reference in view when he says: certe nemo unquam bonus erit Dei discipulus nisi qui silendo eum audiat; … non enim Deus nisi sedato animo audiri potest, as is evident from the note: (Jacobus) vult proterviam nostram corripere, ne … intempestive obstrepamus Deo.
Jam 1:20 gives the reason of the exhortation βραδὺς εἰς ὀργήν: for the wrath of man works not the righteousness of God. The preponderance of authorities decides against the reading κατεργάζεται, and in favour of ἐργάζεται. From the fact that δικαιοσύνην is twice in the N. T., namely Act 10:35 and Heb 11:33, joined with the simple verb, it does not follow that ἐργάζεται is a later correction (against de Wette, Wiesinger), especially as κατεργάζεσθαι is also found united with abstract substantives, as in Rom 1:27 with τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην, in Rom 2:9 with τὸ κακόν, and in Rom 7:18 with τὸ καλόν. With the reading ἐργάζεται,-and also with κατεργάζεται, when this latter, as is frequently the case (see especially Rom 2:9-10), is synonymous with the former,
δικαιοσύνη is equivalent to τὸ δίκαιον, as is frequently the case in the O. and N. T.; see Act 10:35 above referred to, and the frequently occurring phrase: ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, Gen 18:19; Isa 56:1; Mat 6:1; 1Jn 2:29; 1Jn 3:7; 1Jn 3:10; Rev 22:11. Θεοῦ is added in contrast to ἀνδρός for the sake of a more exact statement, so that δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ is the righteousness willed by God[91] (similar to τὸ δίκαιον ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, Act 4:19; Luther: “the wrath of man works not that which is right before God”); so Beza, Hornejus, Wolf, Bengel, de Wette, Bouman, and others correctly explain it. The opposite of δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι is ἁμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθαι, chap. Jam 2:9 (comp. Mat 7:1 : ἐργαζ. τὴν ἀνομίαν; 1Ma 9:23 : ἐργαζ. τὴν ἀδικίαν; also comp. Rom 2:10 : ἐργαζ. τὸ ἀγαθόν; Gal 6:10). James was the more constrained to give prominence to this idea, as ὀργή itself and the words flowing from it were considered by the pharisaical disposition of Christians, against whom this warning is directed, and of whom it was said: ζῆλον Θεοῦ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ κατʼ ἐπίγνωσιν, Rom 10:2, as something that was pleasing to God. With the reading κατεργάζεται this verb may also be equivalent to effect, to bring about (as Jam 1:3). Gebser, Grashof, and others understand, in accordance with this view, by δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ: “the condition of justification before God;” but, on the one hand, an unsuitable thought is expressed by this, and, on the other hand, a mode of expressing the idea δικαιοσύνη τοῦ Θεοῦ, peculiar to Paul, is without ceremony ascribed to James. But as little is it to be justified when Wiesinger, following Hofmann (Schriftbew. I. ed. 1, p. 548 f.), finds expressed in the words of James, that “one by wrathful zeal effects not on others the δικ. Θεοῦ, i.e. that state of righteousness in which God begets men by His word of truth.”[92] Though δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ can denote the righteousness wrought by God, yet this idea is here unsuitable, since no man could entertain the opinion that his wrath could do what can only be effected by God. Also in this case James would only emphasize an impossibility of ὀργή, whereas he was required to bring prominently forward its rejection; moreover, on others is inserted into the text.[93] The same reasons are also decisive against the explanation of Brückner (“the wrath of man works not the righteousness which God accomplishes-this generally stated both in respect to the ἈΝΉΡ and in respect to others on whom one strives to work”), in which a twofold reference is arbitrarily assumed. Brückner correctly rejects the explanation of Lange, that James speaks against “the delusion of wrath, which imagines to administer and accomplish in the world the righteousness of God especially against unbelievers,” because there is no reference to this in the context; it is, moreover, linguistically unmaintainable, as ἘΡΓΆΖΕΣΘΑΙ does not mean “to administer and accomplish.”
ἈΝΔΡΌς stands here as in Jam 1:8; Jam 1:12; it forms a contrast neither to the child (Thomas: ira fortis et deliberate non dicit pueri, qui cito transit), nor to the woman (Bengel: sexns virilis maxime iram alit), nor to ἄνθρωπος, Jam 1:19 (Lange).
[91] It is true the expression δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ occurs not elsewhere in this sense; but this can be the less an objection to it, as the relation in which the genitive Θεοῦ is placed to δικαιοσύνη is not entirely opposed to the genitive of relation, as is evident if we designate the δικ. Θ. as that δικαιοσύνη which is actually so according to the determination of God.
[92] In the second edition (p. 628), Hofmann has indeed altered the words, but not the thought, in the explanation given in the first edition. When he defines the distinction in the use of the idea δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, in Rom 1:17 and here, to consist in this, that Paul speaks of justification, in James of regeneration, the untenableness of his explanation is the more evident, for that ὀργή produces regeneration could occur to no one.
[93] Contrary to the Biblical use of language, Oecumenius explains the expression δικαιοσύνη as equivalent to ἕξις ἑν ψυχῇ κατʼ ἀξίαν ἐκάστῳ ἀκονεμητική. Pott wholly arbitrarily refers the verse to the teachers of the Christian religion, paraphrasing it: iratus nequit docere religionem christianum prout fas est Deoque probatur.-Several commentators (also Kern) to this verse cite Sir 1:21 : οὐ δυνήσεται θυμὸς ἄδικος δικαιωθῆναι; but incorrectly, since δικαιωθῆναι has an entirely different meaning from κατεργάζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ.
Jam 1:21. James infers (διό) from the thought in Jam 1:20 the exhortation ἐν πραΰτητι δέξασθε τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον, with evident reference to ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς λόγῳ ἀληθείας (Jam 1:18). He places before this exhortation the participial clause: ἀποθέμενοι … κακίας] laying aside all filthiness and abundance of wickedness, i.e. all filthy and abundantly prevalent wickedness. The word ῥυπαρία (ἅπ. λεγ. in the N. T.) is here figurative (synonymous with ἀκαθαρσία in Rom 6:19 and other places), as ῥυπαρός and ῥυπαρεύω, Rev 22:11 (ῥυπαρός occurs in its literal sense in chap. Jam 2:2 : ῥύπος in 1Pe 3:21). Several interpreters (Calvin, Rosenmüller, Baumgarten, Hornejus, Bouman, Lange, and others) take it here as standing alone, equivalent to moral uncleanness (see 2Co 7:1 : πᾶς μολυσμὸς σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος), either generally “every immoral disposition,” or specifically as avaritia (Storr), or scortatio (Laurentius), or vitia intemperantiae, gulae et lasciviae (Heisen), or “filth in a religious theocratical sense” (Lange); but it is better to join ῥυπαρίαν with κακίας (Theile, de Wette, Wiesinger, and others), so that the ethical judgment of the author on the κακία is thereby expressed (comp. Act 15:20; Rev 17:4), equivalent to πᾶσαν κακίαν ῥυπαράν, or less exactly ῥυπαίνουσαν τὸν ἄνθρωπον (Schol. on Matt.); only the idea is more strongly brought forward by the substantive than by the adjective. The word περισσεία, united to ῥυπαρίαν by the copulative καί (not as Schneckenburger thinks exegetical; in the cited passages, Joh 1:16 and 1Co 3:5, the position of καί is entirely different), foreign to classical Greek, has in the N. T. the signification abundance, properly: “abundance flowing over the measure,” which Lange incorrectly renders “outflow, communication of life;” see Rom 5:17; 2Co 8:2; 2Co 10:15. Nevertheless the word has been here taken in a meaning corresponding to ῥυπαρία, and has been explained as = περίσσωμα excrementum (Beza, Piscator, Erasmus, Schmid, and others), or also growth (Lösner, Pott, Hottinger, Kern, Schneckenburger, de Wette). But both meanings are arbitrary. The defenders of the second explanation indeed appeal to the passage in Philo, de vict. off. p. 854 B: περιτέμνεσθε … τὰς περιττὰς φύσεις (fortasse ἐμφύσεις, de Wette) τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ; but from this passage it does not follow that περισσεία can be explained de ramis in vite vel arbore abundantibus falceque resecandis (Lösner). It is equally unjustifiable when Küttner, Michaelis, Augusti, Gebser, Bouman, and others explain περισσεία κακίας as “κακία surviving from earlier times,” and thus take περισσεία as synonymous with περίσσευμα (Mar 8:8). Against all these arbitrary views Theile, Wiesinger, Brückner correctly retain the word in the same sense which it has elsewhere in the N. T., so that περισσεία κακίας is the abundance of κακία, i.e. the abundantly existing κακία; only ἐν ὑμῖν is hardly to be supplied as if James had only his readers specially in view (Theile: quod lectoribus peculiare erat).
Κακία is not here synonymous with πονηρία (1Co 5:8) = vitiositas (Semler, Theile, and others), but, according to the context, in contrast with ἐν πραΰτητι, as in Eph 4:31, Col 3:8, Tit 3:3, 1Pe 2:1, a more special idea, namely, the hostile disposition toward our neighbour which we call malignity (Cremer: malevolence, as social faultiness). Wiesinger inaccurately takes it as equivalent to ὀργή, as that is only one of the proofs of κακία; incorrectly Rosenmüller = morositas.[94] On ἀποθέμενοι, comp. Eph 4:25; 1Pe 2:1; Heb 12:1.[95] The participle precedes as a subordinate thought to δέξασθε, because in consequence of man’s sinful nature room can only be made for the good by the rejection of the bad. Also, where similar sentences are co-ordinate, the exhortation to ἀποτίθεσθαι precedes; comp. Rom 13:12, Eph 4:22-23, and also the exhortation of Christ: μετανοεῖτα καὶ πιστεύετε, Mar 1:15.
In the positive exhortation: ἐν πραΰτητι δέξασθε τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον] ἐν πραΰτητι emphatically precedes, in contrast to the κακία from which flows ὀργή. πραΰτης (= πραότης) denotes a loving, gentle disposition toward our neighbour; comp. 1Co 4:21, 2Ti 2:25, Tit 3:2, and other passages; the opposite is ὀριλότης (Pape’s Gr. Wörterb.); incorrectly Calvin: hoc verbo significat modestiam et facilitatem mentis ad discendum compositae. ἐν πραΰτητι does not therefore mean docili animo (Grotius, Rosenmüller, Hottinger), nor “with a modest disposition, which recognises the good deeds of Christianity” (Gebser). Also ἐν πρ. δέξασθε is not a pregnant construction, as if the sense were: monet … illo λόγῳ duce πραΰτητα exerceant (Schneckenburger); but James exhorts to the reception of the word ἐν πραΰτητι, in contrast to those who hear the word in order to use it as a weapon of hatred (condemning others).
Δέξασθε (opp. to λαλῆσαι, Jam 1:19) corresponds to ἀκοῦσαι, but expresses more than that, namely: “the inner reception, the taking hold of it with the heart;” comp. 1Th 1:6. The object belonging to it: τὸν λόγον ἔμφυτον, can only be the same as what was called the λόγος ἀληθείας in Jam 1:18 (Wiesinger); it is neither “the reason innate in man “(Oecumenius: τὸν διακριτικὸν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· καθʼ ὃ καὶ λογικοὶ ἐσμὲν καὶ λεγόμεθα; see Constit. Apost. viii. 12: νόμον δέδωκας ἔμφυτον), nor the so-called inner light of the mystics, nor the gospel “in its subjective form of life” (Lange). The verb δέχεσθαι is opposed to these explanations. James designates the gospel a λόγον ἔμφυτον, inasmuch as it was no longer strange to the hearts of his readers as Christians; also because it was not merely transmitted (Hottinger: ἔμφυτος = traditus), but implanted.[96] The verb δέξασθε does not conflict with this, as the word by which the new birth is effected among Christians is to them ever proclaimed anew, and must by them be ever received anew, in order that the new life may be preserved and increased in them. It is therefore not necessary, against the use of language, to change the idea: verbum quod implantatum or insertum est, into: verbum quod implantatur or inseritur, or to assume here a prolepsis, as is undoubtedly the case in 1Co 1:8, Php 3:21 (see Meyer in loco), and 1Th 3:13 (Lünemann in loco), and with Calvin to explain it: ita suscipite ut vere inseratur (similarly Semler, de Wette,[97] and others). The mode in which the adjective is united with the substantive is opposed to a prolepsis, which would be only imaginable were it said: ΤῸΝ ΛΌΓΟΝ ἜΜΦΥΤΟΝ ΤΑῖς ΚΑΡΔΊΑΙς ὙΜῶΝ, or something similar.
For the strengthening of the exhortation expressed, James annexes to ΤῸΝ ἜΜΦΥΤΟΝ ΛΌΓΟΝ the clause ΤῸΝ ΔΥΝΆΜΕΝΟΝ ΣῶΣΑΙ ΤᾺς ΨΥΧᾺς ὙΜῶΝ, by which, on the one hand, the value of the ΛΌΓΟς is prominently brought forward, and, on the other hand, is indicated what result ought to arise from the hearing of the word. By the verb ΔΥΝΆΜΕΝΟΝ not the freedom of the human will (Serrarius: quod potest salvare, ut arbitrii libertas indicetur), but the power of the word is emphasized; it is, as Paul says, δύναμις Θεοῦ εἰς σωτηρίαν πάντι τῷ πιστεύσντι (Rom 1:16). But if it has this power, man must receive it, and that in a right manner, so that it may prove its efficacy in him and save his soul. It is to be observed that James says this of his readers, whom he had previously designated as born again (Jam 1:18). Thus, according to James, Christians by the new birth do not as yet possess ΣΩΤΗΡΊΑ (the future salvation), but its obtainment is conditioned by their conduct.
Instead of ΤᾺς ΨΥΧᾺς ὙΜῶΝ, James might simply have written ὙΜᾶς, but Schneckenburger correctly warns: cave pro mera sumas circumscriptione personalis; animi enim proprie res agitur; see chap. Jam 5:20.
[94] Meyer’s translation: malice (Rom 1:29), malicious disposition (Col 3:8), would also not be entirely suitable, but too special. How Luther has understood the idea cannot be determined from his translation wickedness (Boshcit); since he thus constantly renders κακία, it may be taken in a general or in a special sense; the word badness (Schlechtigkeit) does not occur with him.
[95] To the assertion of Lange, that ἀποθέμενοι is not to be rendered putting off, because the reference is not figuratively to the putting off of filthy garments, but removing; the passages Rom 13:12 (ἀποθώμεθα … ἐνδυσώμεθα) and Eph 4:22; Eph 4:24, and the etymology of the word are opposed.
[96] Lange incorrectly explains the ἐν ὑμῖν to be supplied to ἔμφυτον “in and among you,” referring it to the Jewish Christians and the Jews.
[97] De Wette expresses himself doubtfully: “Either the adjective is used proleptically, or, which I prefer, it is the word implanted by the second birth; but by this also, on account of δέξασθε, a prolepsis occurs, ‘receive the word of truth, that it may grow in you by that new birth.’ ” But opposed to this, it is to be observed that the word is not implanted by the second birth, but that the second birth is the fruit of the implanted word. In conclusion de Wette remarks: “It must be taken rather as a reference to the whole of Christendom than to individuals: the word implanted in us Christians.” But the individual is only a member of the church by having the word of God implanted in him. Brückner has given the correct explanation.
Jam 1:22. The exhortations given in Jam 1:19 form the starting-point for what follows. The next section, to the end of chap. 2, is attached to the thought ταχὺς εἰς τὸ ἀκοῦσαι, which is continued in δέξασθε τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον. The word must be so heard and received that it produces a corresponding activity. James first expresses this thought briefly and definitely: “Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only, deceiving your own selves.” The verb γίνεσθε is neither intended to express the successionem perpetuam horum exercitiorum (Semler), nor to indicate that hitherto the readers had not been ποιηταὶ λόγου; this indication is contained in the whole exhortation, but not in the verb, which is to be translated not by become, but by be; comp. chap. Jam 3:1; Mat 6:16; Mat 10:16; Mat 24:44; Joh 20:27; Rom 12:16.[98] The particle δέ unites this verse with the preceding as its completion. The readers ought to be ποιηταὶ λόγου, namely, of the λόγος ἔμφυτος (Jam 1:21), or of the λόγος ἀληθείας (Jam 1:18), the gospel, inasmuch as it requires a definite Christian conduct, and on this account in Jam 1:25 is expressly called a νόμος. On ποιηταί, comp. Jam 4:11; 1Ma 2:67; Rom 2:13 (Joh 7:19 : ποιεῖν τὸν νόμον); in the classical language, ὁ ποιητὴς νόμου is the lawgiver. Theile correctly observes: substantiva plus sonant quam participia; the substantive expresses the enduring relation.
In the reading μὴ ἀκροαταὶ μόνον, μόνον is closely united with ἀκροαταὶ: not such who are only hearers. The word ἀκροατής, in classical Greek “an attentive hearer,” occurs in the N. T. only here and in Rom 2:13, but both times without that additional meaning. On the thought, comp. besides Rom 2:13 (where the same contrast is expressed), Mat 7:21 ff.; Luk 11:28; Joh 13:17.
παραλογιζόμενοι] belongs to the subject contained in γίνεσθε (de Wette, Wiesinger), deceiving your own selves, and not as a more exact definition of ἀκροαταί, “hearers who deceive themselves” (Stolz, Gebser, Schneckenburger, Lange). The import of the word (besides here in the N. T. only in Col 2:4, in the O. T. Gen 29:25, LXX.; synonymous expressions are found in Jam 1:26; Gal 6:3; 1Jn 1:8) is to draw false inferences, to deceive by sophistical reasoning. The warning is directed against such who deceive themselves by sophisms on the utility of mere hearing.
[98] Meyer certainly explains the imperative γίνου, γίνεσθε, uniformly by “become thou,” “become ye;” but this meaning is frequently retained in a manner more or less forced; comp. especially Joh 20:27. The N. T. usage, to consider γίνου as equivalent to ἴσθι, is explained from the fact that the Christian must yet ever more become that which he as a Christian is.
Jam 1:23. This exhortation is confirmed by a comparison. Therefore: ὅτι, which is not superfluous (Pott). This verse expresses the similitude; Jam 1:24 the tertium comparationis. A hearer, who is not a doer, is to be compared to a man who contemplates his bodily form in a glass. Hornejus, Rosenmüller, Semler, Pott, and others, attach to the word κατανοεῖν the additional meaning of a transitory observation, against the etymology and the linguistic use of the word (comp. Luk 12:24; Luk 12:37; Act 7:31-32; Act 11:6). The point of transitoriness, or, more correctly, of transitory contemplation, is contained not in the verb, but in the situation, which in Jam 1:24 is prominently brought forward by καὶ ἀπελήλυθεν. On the rhetorical usage of again resuming the foregoing subject (which is here expressed by εἴ τις κ.τ.λ.) by οὗτος, see Winer, p. 144 [E. T. 199]; A. Buttmann, p. 262 [E. T. 347]; on ἔοικε, see Jam 1:6; ἀνδρί, as in Jam 1:8, and frequently with James.[99]
τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ] By πόρσωπον is here meant not the whole form (Baumgarten, Hensler, Pott, Schneckenburger), but the face. By τῆς γενέσεως is “more plainly indicated the sphere of mere material perception, from which the comparison is taken, as distinguished from the ethical sphere of ἀκροᾶσθαι” (Wiesinger). γένεσις denotes not so much the natural life as the natural birth, so that the phrase is to be interpreted: the countenance which one possesses by his natural birth. See Eustathius in Od. ix. p. 663, 25.[100]
Whether ΑὐΤΟῦ belongs to the whole idea, or only to the genitive, is uncertain. Winer, p. 212, leaves it undecided; Wiesinger is for the first rendering; but the union here (as well as in Col 1:13) with the genitive appears to be more natural.
[99] The remark of Paes, approved of by Lange, is curious: viri obiter tantum solent specula intueri, muliebre autem est, curiose se ad speculum componere.
[100] Lange argues against this explanation, whilst, mingling in a most confused manner the image employed with the thing itself, he explains πρόσωπον as “the image of the inner man’s appearance according to his sinful condition.”
Jam 1:24. With this verse begins the explanation of the image given in Jam 1:25 (therefore γάρ), whilst κατανοεῖν τὸ πρόσωπον τ. γεν. αὐτοῦ is again resumed by κατενόησεν ἑαυτόν. By ἀπελήλυθεν the point of the mere transitoriness of the contemplation in the glass only before presupposed is brought forward, and by ἐπελάθετο the result of such a contemplation is added, by which the points of application, which James employs, are brought out. The emphasis lies on ἀπελήλυθεν and εὐθέως ἐπελάθετο. The form of representation is here the same as in Jam 1:11. It is not a particular instance which may occur (Wiesinger), but a general statement which is here introduced in the form of a single incident, as the contemplating oneself in the glass is always only a temporary and not a permanent state. The hearing of the word answers to κατανοσεῖν; the averting of the mind from what is heard to ἀπέρχεσθαι; and the being unconcerned about what is heard, by which the realization of the word in the life is prevented, to εὐθέως ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. James can only think on man according to his ethical condition in relation to the demands of the divine will, as corresponding to πρόσωπον τ. γ. or ἑαυτόν in the application. It is true that he does not definitely state this; but from this it does not follow that James, overlooking all other considerations, has had only in view generally the contents of the word, because the comparison of the word with a glass, which gives to him who looks in it to see his own image, would be without meaning.[101] On the use of the perfect (ἀπελήλυθεν) between the aorists, see Winer, p. 243 f. [E. T. 340].
On ὁποῖος ἦν, Wiesinger correctly remarks, “namely in the glass.”
[101] According to most interpreters, “the depravity of the natural man” is chiefly to be thought on; but this is not entirely suitable, as James addresses Christians who as such are no longer natural men. In a wholly arbitrary manner is the reference inserted by some in κατενόησεν, to spots which disfigure the face. Wolf: de tralatitia speculi inspectione loquitur Apostolus; talis vero efficit, ut maculas non perspicias atque adeo de iis abstergendis non cogites; similarly Pott and others.
Jam 1:25 does not give the simple application of the image, but rather describes, with reference to the foregoing image, the right hearer, and says of him that he is μακάριος ἐν τῇ ποιήσει αὐτοῦ. In this description the three points named in Jam 1:24 are carefully observed: παρακύψας εἰς κ.τ.λ. answers to κατενόησεν (ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ), παραμείνας to ἀπελήλυθεν, and οὐκ ἀκροατὴς ἐπιλησμονῆς to ἐπελάθετο. The sentence consists of a simple combination of subject and predicate; γενόμενος is not to be resolved into the finite verb γίνεται (Pott). The predicate commences, after the subject is summed up, in οὗτος with μακάριος.
This is also the case with the textus receptus, where a οὗτος is put before οὐκ ἀκροατής; for, since with this reading the first οὗτος is simply resumed by the second οὗτος (before μακάριος), equivalent to hic, inquam, the words οὐκ ἀκροατὴς … ἔργου only serve to give a more exact designation of the subject, παρακύψας … καὶ παραμείνας being thus more clearly defined. Thus these words begin not the apodosis or principal sentence, as if James would here, in contrast to Jam 1:24, show that the right hearing and appropriation leads to the doing, (and thereby) to the blessedness of doing (against Wiesinger). Were this his object, he would have been obliged to put the finite verb instead of the participle γενόμενος, and a καί after ἔργου. The subject is accordingly: but whosoever looks into the perfect law of liberty and continueth therein, being not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this man.
The aorist participles are explained from the close connection of this verse with the preceding, where the same tense was used. There is no copulative καί before the participial clause οὐκ ἀκροατὴς κ.τ.λ., because the doing of the law is the necessary consequence of the continued looking into it, and it would otherwise have the appearance as if παρακύπτειν and παραμένειν could take place without ποιεῖν following.[102] The verb ΠΑΡΑΚΎΠΤΕΙΝ (properly bending oneself near an object in order to view it more exactly, Luk 24:12; Joh 20:5; Joh 20:11; 1Pe 1:12; Sir 14:23; Sir 21:23) refers back, indeed, to ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕῖΝ, but is a stronger idea. James has fittingly chosen this verb as verbum ad imaginem speculi humi aut mensae impositi adaptatum (Schneckenburger; see also Theile, Wiesinger). Luther inaccurately translates it: looketh through. As the accent is on παρα, the verb ΠΑΡΑΜΕΊΝΑς is used afterwards. By ΕἸς is expressed not only the direction to something, but the intensity of the look into the inner nature of the law. παραμείνας (not continueth therein, as Luther translates it, but thereat) is added to παρακύψας,-without the article, because the two points are to be considered as most closely connected,-indicating the continued consideration of the ΝΌΜΟς, from which action necessarily follows. Schneckenburger incorrectly gives to the verb ΠΑΡΑΜΈΝΕΙΝ here (appealing to Act 14:22; Gal 3:10; Heb 8:9) the meaning to “observe the law;” but the subject treated of here is not the observance, but “the appropriation which leads to action” (Wiesinger), or “the remaining in the yielding of oneself to the object by contemplating it” (Lange). By νόμος τέλειος ὁ τῆς ἐλευθερίας[103] is meant neither the O. T. law, nor lex naturalis (Schulthess), but λόγος ἀληθείας (Jam 1:18), thus the gospel, inasmuch as it places before the Christian-by reason of redemption-the rule of his life. This evangelical νόμος, indeed, resembles the O. T. νόμος in expressing no other will of God, but differs from it in that it only is the νόμος τῆς ἐλευθερίας, the νόμος τέλειος. It not only confronts man as enjoining, but, resting on the love of God, it creates the new life from which joyful obedience springs forth voluntarily and unconstrained; it gives ἐλευθερία, which the O. T. νόμος was not able to give, and thus proves itself as the perfect law in contrast to the imperfect law of the Old Covenant. It is true that even in the O. T. the sweetness of the law was subject of praise (Psa 19:8-11), but the life-giving power belonged to the law only in an imperfect manner, because the covenant on which it rested was as yet only one of promise and not of fulfilment. It is accordingly incorrect to explain the additional attribute as if James considered the O. T. law, according to the Pauline manner, as a ζυγὸς δουλείας (Gal 5:1), for of this there is no trace.[104] Many expositors understand by ΝΌΜΟς ΤΈΛΕΙΟς Κ.Τ.Λ. the gospel, as the joyful message of salvation, or the doctrina evangelii, or simply gratia evangelii, namely, in contrast to the O. T. economy, which, however, corresponds neither to the language of James nor to his mode of contemplation.
In the additional participial sentence, the ideas ἈΚΡΟΑΤῊς ἘΠΙΛΗΣΜΟΝῆς and ΠΟΙΗΤῊς ἜΡΓΟΥ are opposed to each other. ἈΚΡΟΑΤῊς ἘΠΙΛΗΣΜΟΝῆς (the word, foreign to classical Greek, is in the N. T. a ἍΠ. ΛΕΓ.; it is found in Sir 11:27; among classical writers: ἘΠΙΛΉΣΜΗ, ἘΠΙΛΗΣΜΟΣΎΝΗ) is = ἈΚΡ. ἘΠΙΛΉΣΜΩΝ, a hearer to whom forgetfulness belongs. To ΠΟΙΗΤΉς ἜΡΓΟΥ is attached in order to make still more prominent the idea of activity, which indeed is already contained in ΠΟΙΗΤΉς. The singular does not properly stand for the plural (Grotius: effector eorum operum, quae evangelica lex exigit), but “is designed to import that it here results in something, in the doing of work” (Wiesinger). Those ideas, which appear not to correspond, yet form a true antithesis, since the law is inoperative on the forgetful hearer, but incites him who is an attentive hearer to a corresponding activity of life. James says of him who is thus described: he (οὗτος) is blessed in his deed. ποίησις in N. T. ἍΠ. ΛΕΓ., in Sir 19:20 : ΠΟΊΗΣΙς ΝΌΜΟΥ. The preposition ἘΝ is not to be exchanged with ΔΙΆ, for by ἘΝ the internal connection of doing and blessedness is marked; Brückner: “the blessing innate in such doing is meant.” ἜΣΤΑΙ is therefore not to be referred to tire future life; but it is by it announced what is even here directly connected with the ΠΟΊΗΣΙς; James, however, certainly considered this ΜΑΚΑΡΙΌΤΗς as permanent. The thought here expressed refers to the last words of Jam 1:21, completing them, showing that the ΛΌΓΟς has the effect there stated (ΣῶΣΑΙ ΤᾺς ΨΥΧΆς) in him who so embraces it that it leads him to ΠΟΊΣΙς.[105]
[102] Lange agrees in essentials with this explanation, but he thinks that by it “the full energy of the idea is not preserved;” it should rather have been said that “the παρακύψας and παραμείνας, as such, ποιητὴς ἔργου γειόμενος;” but the looking in and continuing is evidently in themselves not identical with the doing of which James speaks, however necessarily the latter results from the former.
[103] Kern incorrectly maintains that this expression is formed according to the Pauline phraseology: νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χρ. Ἰησοῦ, Rom 8:2; νόμος τῆς πίστεως, Rom 3:27; νόμος Χριστοῦ, Gal 6:2; as if James must have borrowed the designation of what was to him the cardinal point of Christian life from another, and could not himself originate it.
[104] It is to be observed that even in the so-called apostolic council at Jerusalem James did not, as Peter, call the law a ζυγός.
[105] Laurentius adds to the last words of the verse: sc. non ex merito ipsius operis, sed ex promissione gratuita; but this is a caution foreign to the context. Lange inappropriately intermingles ideas, when he reckons to this ποίησις particularly confession, and thinks that James above all things indicated that the Jews should confess Christ, and that the Jewish Christians should fully confess their Christian brethren from the Gentiles.
Jam 1:26. Whilst James-in contrast to the hearers who fail in proof by works-will describe the true θρησκεία (Jam 1:27), he first refers to the false θρησκεία of those who-slothful in action-are ταχεῖς εἰς τὸ λαλήσαι (Jam 1:19). If any one thinks to serve God, not bridling his tongue, but deceiving his heart, his worship is vain.
εἴ τις δοκεῖ] δοκεῖ here denotes (as in Mat 6:7; Mat 24:44; 1Co 3:18; otherwise in 1Co 7:40) the false opinion which one has of something; it is not = videtur (Calvin, Gataker, Theile, and others); Luther correctly translates: “if any one imagines.”
θρῆσκος εἶναι] θρῆσκος, which elsewhere occurs neither in the N. T. nor in the classics (the substantive besides here and in Jam 1:27, in the N. T. in Col 2:18 and Act 26:5), is not equivalent to εὐσέβεια, inasmuch as it refers to external worship, the manifestation of εὐσέβεια, without, however, having in itself the secondary idea of mere externality. Incorrectly Theile = religiosus singulatim cujus nimia, nimis externa est religio, superstitiosus. In an arbitrary manner, Schneckenburger infers from the adjectives καθαρὰ καὶ ἀμίαντος (Jam 1:27) that it is here said of θρησκεία, quam in accurata lustrationum observatione constantem putabant Judaei ac Judaeochristiani,[106] of which there is no trace in the whole Epistle. The following words: μὴ χαλιναγωγῶν τὴν γλῶσσαν αὑτοῦ, indicate in what the θρησκεία of the readers consisted. It is incorrect, with Rosenmüller, Theile, and others, to supply exempli causa, and, as most interpreters do, to resolve the participle by although; James will blame those who reckon zeal in speaking as a sign of θρησκεία.[107] The verb χαλιναγωγεῖν, in the N. T. only in James, is also found in classical language only in the later classics; comp. the expression in Plato, de legg. ii.: ἀχάλινον κεκτημένοι τὸ στόμα.
By the second participial sentence: ἀλλὰ ἀπατῶν καρδίαν αὑτοῦ, James expresses his judgment-already indicated by the expression μὴ χαλιναγωγῶν-on the opinion of serving God by λαλεῖν ἐν ὀργῇ. Pott correctly: sc. eo quod nimian docendi licentiam et linguae extemperantiam pro vera θρησκείᾳ habet. The clause belongs not to the apodosis (Schneckenburger), but, as in form so in meaning, is closely connected with the preceding participle. The expression ἀπατᾷν καρδίαν αὑτοῦ corresponds to παραλογίζεσθαι ἑαυτόν (Jam 1:22), but is a stronger form, although it does not indicate only the consequence resulting from zeal (Lange); comp. Test. Napht. III. p. 665: μὴ σπουδάζετε … ἐν λόγοις κενοῖς ἀπατᾷν τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν. Erasmus incorrectly explains ἀπατᾷν by sinere aberrare. The apodosis, which emphatically begins with τούτου, declares that such a θρησκεία is not only without fruit (Baumgarten), but without actual contents, is thus foolish and vain, corresponding to the thought: ὀργὴ δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ οὐ (κατ)εργάζεται (Jam 1:20).
[106] Some Catholic interpreters, Salmero, Paes, and others, refer the expression to the observance of the so-called consilia Christi, particularly to voluntary circumcision for the sake of the kingdom of heaven.
[107] Rauch also thinks that “the participles must certainly be resolved by although;” but by this explanation all indication is wanting of that on which those blamed by James rest θρησκεία; also what follows (ver. 27), where the nature of true θρησκεία is given, forms no appropriate antithesis to this verse. Brückner explains it: “whosoever seeks worship in striving by teaching to work on others;” here the participle is correctly resolved, but the full meaning is not given to the verb. Correctly Lange: “those who by their fanatical zeal wanted to make good their pretensions of being the true soldiers of God.”
Jam 1:27. To θρησκεία μάταιος is opposed θρησκεία καθαρὰ καὶ ἀμίαντος παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ]. Καθαρός and ἀμίαντος are synonymous expressions (Pott, Theile, and others); the second word does not add any new idea to the first. Some expositors (Baumgarten, Bengel, Knapp, Wiesinger) arbitrarily refer the first word to what is internal, and the second to what is external. The second word ἀμίαντος (which occurs only here and in Heb 7:20; Heb 13:4; 1Pe 1:4), corresponding to its connection with μιαίνω, μιάσμα, brings more vividly forward purity as a being free from that by which the holy is defiled. The purity of true θρησκεία is, by the words παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ κ.τ.λ., marked as absolute. παρά, in the judgment of, equivalent to ἐνώπιον, as in 1Pe 2:20; comp. Winer, p. 352 [E. T. 493]; Schirlitz, p. 340. That by this “the attitude of a servant before the face of the commanding lord” (Lange) is indicated, is a pure fiction. To τῷ Θεῷ is emphatically added καὶ πατρί, by which the relation of God, which the author has chiefly in view, is expressed: that of love. God, by reason of His love, can only esteem that worship as pure which is the expression of love. The contents of pure worship is given in the following infinitive clauses, according to its positive and negative side; still James evidently does not intend to give an exhaustive definition, but he merely brings forward-in reference to the wants of his readers-two chief points. Hermas, I. 2, mand. 8, gives a description of these two sides of worship, comprehending as much as possible all particulars. The first point is: the visiting of the widows and the fatherless in their affliction, as a manifestation of compassionate love. If it is said that the particular here stands for the universal (the species pro genere, Hottinger, Theile, and others); yet it is to be observed that elsewhere in the Holy Scriptures compassion is adduced as the most direct proof of love. The verb ἐπισκέπτεσθαι here, as in Mat 25:36; Mat 25:43, Jer 23:2, Zec 11:16, Sir 7:35, refers to the visiting of the suffering, in order to help them. By the explanation: “to be careful of them” (Lange), the view of a concrete instance is introduced; ὀρφανοί are placed first, in close connection with πατρί,[108] as God in Psa 68:6 is expressly called Ὁ ΠΑΤῊΡ ΤῶΝ ὈΡΦΑΝῶΝ; see also Sir 4:10 : ΓΊΝΟΥ ὈΡΦΑΝΟῖς Ὡς ΠΑΤΉΡ.
The words ἘΝ Τῇ ΘΛΊΨΕΙ ΑὐΤῶΝ are not an idle addition, but mark the condition in which the orphans and widows are found, to show the necessity and object of ἘΠΙΣΚΈΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ.
In the second infinitive clause, which is added with rhetorical emphasis, ἈΣΥΝΔΕΤῶς,[109] to the first, ἌΣΠΙΛΟΝ stands first as the chief idea. The same expression is in 1Ti 6:14; 2Pe 3:14 (in its proper sense, 1Pe 1:19). The addition ἈΠῸ ΤΟῦ ΚΌΣΜΟΥ, more exactly defining ἌΣΠΙΛΟΝ ΤΗΡΕῖΝ, is neither dependent merely on ΤΗΡΕῖΝ (Psa 12:8; Psa 141:9) nor merely on ἌΣΠΙΛΟΝ, but on the combined idea. The sense is: to preserve himself from the world (ἈΠΌ = ἘΚ, Joh 17:15; comp. also the form ΠΡΟΣΈΧΕΙΝ ἈΠΌ, Mat 16:12), so that he is not polluted by it (so also Lange). By ΚΌΣΜΟς not merely earthly things, so far as they tempt to sin (Schneckenburger), nor merely sinful lusts (Hottinger), nor δημώδης καὶ συρφετὸς ὄχλος, ὁ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἀπάτης αὑτοῦ φθειρόμενος (Oecumenius; according to Laurentius and others, the homines mundani atque impii), are to be understood; but the idea ΚΌΣΜΟς comprehends all these together; it denotes the whole earthly creation, so far as it is cut off from fellowship with God and stands under the dominion of ἌΡΧΩΝ ΤΟῦ ΚΌΣΜΟΥ (1Jn 5:19); thus especially the men who serve it in and with their sinful lusts-but also all earthly possessions by which sinful lust is excited, and to which it not only conforms itself, but converts them into the instruments of its activity.
Christians by means of their divine birth, effected by the word of truth (Jam 1:18), are indeed taken out of the ΚΌΣΜΟς, they are no longer members of it; but, on the other hand, both by the sin which is still in them (chap. Jam 3:2) and by their external intercourse, they stand in connection with the world, on which account they have to preserve themselves from its contaminating influence. This preservation, as it is a work of God (Joh 17:15), so it is likewise a work of man (1Ti 5:22), and therefore a task which believers must continually strive to perform.
[108] The combination ὀρφανοὶ καὶ χῆραι is found only here in the N. T.; it often occurs in the O. T. and Apocrypha, where sometimes ὀρφανοί and sometimes χῆραι are named first.
[109] The asyndeton is thus explained, that James considered the visiting of the orphans, etc., as keeping oneself unspotted from the world, being in contradiction with the peculiar charms of the world. Lange observes: “the two clauses are not simply co-ordinate, but the second is the reverse side or sequence of the first, its pure antithesis.”
1. To the twelve tribes. When the ten tribes were banished, the Assyrian king placed them in different parts. Afterwards, as it usually happens in the revolutions of kingdoms (such as then took place,) it is very probable that they moved here and there in all directions. And the Jews had been scattered almost unto all quarters of the world. He then wrote and exhorted all those whom he could not personally address, because they had been scattered far and wide. But that he speaks not of the grace of Christ and of faith in him, the reason seems to be this, because he addressed those who had already been rightly taught by others; so that they had need, not so much of doctrine, as of the goads of exhortations. (98)
(98) The salutation is peculiar; but in the same form with the letter sent to Antioch by the Apostles, (of whom James was one,) and the church at Jerusalem, Act 15:23. It is therefore apostolic, although adopted from a form commonly used by the heathen writers. See Act 23:26. John in Joh 2:10 and Joh 2:11 uses the verb χαίρειν in a similar sense; and it means properly to rejoice. It being an infinitive, the verb λέγω, to say or to bid, is put before it by John, and is evidently understood here. Hence the salutation may thus be rendered, —
“James, a servant of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ, bids, (or sends, or wishes) joy to the twelve tribes who are in their dispersion.”
There had been an eastern and a western dispersion, the first at the Assyrian and Babylonian captivity, and the second during the predominancy of the Grecian power, which commenced with Alexander the Great. As this epistle was written in Greek, it was no doubt intended more especially for those of the latter dispersion. But the benefit of the eastern dispersion was soon consulted, as the very first version of the New Testament was made into this language, that is, the Syriac; and this was done at the beginning of the second century.
2. All joy. The first exhortation is, to bear trials with a cheerful mind. And it was especially necessary at that time to comfort the Jews, almost overwhelmed as they were with troubles. For the very name of the nation was so infamous, that they were hated and despised by all people wherever they went; and their condition as Christians rendered them still more miserable, because they held their own nation as their most inveterate enemies. At the same time, this consolation was not so suited to one time, but that it is always useful to believers, whose life is a constant warfare on earth.
But that we may know more fully what he means, we must doubtless take temptations or trials as including all adverse things; and they are so called, because they are the tests of our obedience to God. He bids the faithful, while exercised with these, to rejoice; and that not only when they fall into one temptation, but into many, not only of one kind, but of various kinds. And doubtless, since they serve to mortify our flesh, as the vices of the flesh continually shoot up in us, so they must necessarily be often repeated. Besides, as we labor under diseases, so it is no wonder that different remedies are applied to remove them.
The Lord then afflicts us in various ways, because ambition, avarice, envy, gluttony, intemperance, excessive love of the world, and the innumerable lusts in which we abound, cannot be cured by the same medicine.
When he bids us to count it all joy, it is the same as though he had said, that temptations ought to be so deemed as gain, as to be regarded as occasions of joy. He means, in short, that there is nothing in afflictions which ought to disturb our joy. And thus, he not only commands us to bear adversities calmly, and with an even mind, but shews us that this is a reason why the faithful should rejoice when pressed down by them.
It is, indeed, certain, that all the senses of our nature are so formed, that every trial produces in us grief and sorrow; and no one of us can so far divest himself of his nature as not to grieve and be sorrowful whenever he feels any evil. But this does not prevent the children of God to rise, by the guidance of the Spirit, above the sorrow of the flesh. Hence it is, that in the midst of trouble they cease not to rejoice.
3. Knowing this, that the trying. We now see why he called adversities trials or temptations, even because they serve to try our faith. And there is here a reason given to confirm the last sentence. For it might, on the other hand, be objected, “How comes it, that we judge that sweet which to the sense is bitter?” He then shews by the effect that we ought to rejoice in afflictions, because they produce fruit that ought to be highly valued, even patience. If God then provides for our salvation, he affords us an occasion of rejoicing. Peter uses a similar argument at the beginning of his first Epistle, “That the trial of your faith, more precious than gold, may be,” etc. [1Pe 1:7.] We certainly dread diseases, and want, and exile, and prison, and reproach, and death, because we regard them as evils; but when we understand that they are turned through God’s kindness unto helps and aids to our salvation, it is ingratitude to murmur, and not willingly to submit to be thus paternally dealt with.
Paul says, in Rom 5:3, that we are to glory in tribulations; and James says here, that we are to rejoice. “We glory,” says Paul, “in tribulations, knowing that tribulation worketh patience.” What immediately follows seems contrary to the words of James; for he mentions probation in the third place, as the effect of patience, which is here put first as though it were the cause. But the solution is obvious; the word there has an active, but here a passive meaning. Probation or trial is said by James to produce patience; for were not God to try us, but leave us free from trouble, there would be no patience, which is no other thing than fortitude of mind in bearing evils. But Paul means, that while by enduring we conquer evils, we experience how much God’s help avails in necessities; for then the truth of God is as it were in reality manifested to us. Hence it comes that we dare to entertain more hope as to futurity; for the truth of God, known by experience, is more fully believed by us. Hence Paul teaches that by such a probation, that is, by such an experience of divine grace, hope is produced, not that hope then only begins, but that it increases and is confirmed. But both mean, that tribulation is the means by which patience is produced.
Moreover, the minds of men are not so formed by nature, that affliction of itself produces patience in them. But Paul and Peter regard not so much the nature of men as the providence of God through which it comes, that the faithful learn patience from troubles; for the ungodly are thereby more and more provoked to madness, as the example of Pharaoh proves. (99)
(99) The word used by James is δοχίμιον, trial, the act of testing, and by Paul δοχιμὴ, the result of testing, experience. James speaks of probation, and Paul of the experience gained thereby.
4. But let patience have her perfect work. As boldness and courage often appear in us and soon fail, he therefore requires perseverance. “Real patience,” he says, “is that which endures to the end.” For work here means the effort not only to overcome in one contest, but to persevere through life. His perfection may also he referred to the sincerity of the soul, that men ought willingly and not feignedly to submit to God; but as the word work is added, I prefer to explain it of constancy. For there are many, as we have said, who shew at first an heroic greatness, and shortly after grow weary and faint. He therefore bids those who would be perfect and entire, (100) to persevere to the end. But what he means by these two words, he afterwards explains of those who fail not, or become not wearied: for they, who being overcome as to patience, be broken down, must, by degrees, be necessarily weakened, and at length wholly fail.
(100) “Perfect, τέλειοι,” fully grown, mature; “entire, ὁλόχληζοι, ” complete, no part wanting. The first refers to the maturity of grace; and the second to its completeness, no grace being wanting. They were to be like men full grown, and not maimed or mutilated, but having all their members complete.
5. If any of you lack wisdom. As our reason, and all our feelings are averse to the thought that we can be happy in the midst of evils, he bids us to ask of the Lord to give us wisdom. For wisdom here, I confine to the subject of the passage, as though he had said, “If this doctrine is higher than what your minds can reach to, ask of the Lord to illuminate you by his Spirit; for as this consolation alone is sufficient to mitigate all the bitterness of evils, that what is grievous to the flesh is salutary to us; so we must necessarily be overcome with impatience, except we be sustained by this kind of comfort.” Since we see that the Lord does not so require from us what is above our strength, but that he is ready to help us, provided we ask, let us, therefore, learn, whenever he commands anything, to ask from him the power to perform it.
Though in this place to be wise is to submit to God in the endurance of evils, under a due conviction that he so orders all things as to promote our salvation; yet the sentence may be generally applied to every branch of right knowledge.
But why does he say If any one, as though all of them did not want wisdom. To this I answer, that all are by nature without it; but that some are gifted with the spirit of wisdom, while others are without it. As, then, all had not made such progress as to rejoice in affliction, but few there were to whom this had been given, James, therefore, referred to such cases; and he reminded those who were not as yet fully convinced that by the cross their salvation was promoted by the Lord, that they were to ask to be endued with wisdom. And yet there is no doubt, but that necessity reminds us all to ask the same thing; for he who has made the greatest progress, is yet far off from the goal. But to ask an increase of wisdom is another thing than to ask for it at first.
When he bids us to ask of the Lord, he intimates, that he alone can heal our diseases and relieve our wants.
That giveth to all men liberally. By all, he means those who ask; for they who seek no remedy for their wants, deserve to pine away in them. However, this universal declaration, by which every one of us is invited to ask, without exception, is very important; hence no man ought to deprive himself of so great a privilege.
To the same purpose is the promise which immediately follows; for as by this command he shews what is the duty of every one, so he affirms that they would not do in vain what he commands; according to what is said by Christ,
“Knock, and it shall be opened.”
(Mat 7:7; Luk 11:9.)
The word liberally, or freely, denotes promptitude in giving. So Paul, in Rom 12:8, requires simplicity in deacons. And in 2Co 8:0 and 2Co 9:0, when speaking of charity or love, he repeats the same word several times. The meaning, then, is, that God is so inclined and ready to give, that he rejects none, or haughtily puts them off, being not like the niggardly and grasping, who either sparingly, as with a closed hand, give but little, or give only a part of what they were about to give, or long debate with themselves whether to give or not. (101)
And upbraideth not. This is added, lest any one should fear to come too often to God. Those who are the most liberal among men, when any one asks often to be helped, mention their formal acts of kindness, and thus excuse themselves for the future. Hence, a mortal man, however open-handed he may be, we are ashamed to weary by asking too often. But James reminds us, that there is nothing like this in God; for he is ready ever to add new blessings to former ones, without any end or limitation.
(101) The literal meaning of ἁπλῶς is simply without any mixture; the noun, ἁπλότης, is used in the sense of sincerity, which has no mixture of hypocrisy or fraud, (2Co 1:12.) and in the sense of liberality, or disposition free from what is sordid or parsimonious, having no mixture of niggardliness, (2Co 8:2.) This latter is evidently the meaning here, so that “liberally,” according to our version, is the best word.
6. But let him ask in faith. He shews here, first the right way of praying; for as we cannot pray without the word, as it were, leading the way, so we must believe before we pray; for we testify by prayer, that we hope to obtain from God the grace which he has promised. Thus every one who has no faith in the promises, prays dissemblingly. Hence, also, we learn what is true faith; for James, after having bidden us to ask in faith, adds this explanation, nothing wavering, or, doubting nothing. Then faith is that which relies on God’s promises, and makes us sure of obtaining what we ask. It hence follows, that it is connected with confidence and certainty as to God’s love towards us. The verb διακρίνεσθαι, which he uses, means properly to inquire into both sides of a question, after the manner of pleaders. He would have us then to be so convinced of what God has once promised, as not to admit a doubt whether he shall be heard or not.
He that wavereth, or doubteth. By this similitude he strikingly expresses how God punishes the unbelief of those who doubt his promises; for, by their own restlessness, they torment themselves inwardly; for there is never any calmness for our souls, except they recumb on the truth of God. He, at length, concludes, that such are unworthy to receive anything from God.
This is a remarkable passage, fitted to disprove that impious dogma which is counted as an oracle under the whole Papacy, that is, that we ought to pray doubtingly, and with uncertainty as to our success. This principle, then, we hold, that our prayers are not heard by the Lord, except when we have a confidence that we shall obtain. It cannot indeed be otherwise, but that through the infirmity of our flesh we must be tossed by various temptations, which are like engines employed to shake our confidence; so that no one is found who does not vacillate and tremble according to the feeling of his flesh; but temptations of this kind are at length to be overcome by faith. The case is the same as with a tree, which has struck firm roots; it shakes, indeed, through the blowing of the wind, but is not rooted up; on the contrary, it remains firm in its own place.
8. A double-minded man, or, a man of a double mind. This sentence may be read by itself, as he speaks generally of hypocrites. It seems, however, to me to be rather the conclusion of the preceding doctrine; and thus there is an implied contrast between the simplicity or liberality of God, mentioned before, and the double-mindedness of man; for as God gives to us with a stretched out hand, so it behooves us in our turn to open the bosom of our heart. He then says that the unbelieving, who have tortuous recesses, are unstable; because they are never firm or fixed, but at one time they swell with the confidence of the flesh, at another they sink into the depth of despair. (102)
(102) “The double-minded,” or the man with two souls, δίψυχος, means here no doubt the man who hesitates between faith and unbelief, because faith is the subject of the passage. When again used, in Jas 4:8, it means a hesitation between God and the world.
9. Let the brother of low degree. As Paul, exhorting servants submissively to bear their lot, sets before them this consolation, that they were the free-men of God, having been set free by his grace from the most miserable bondage of Satan, and reminds them, though free, yet to remember that they were the servants of God; so here James in the same manner bids the lowly to glory in this, that they had been adopted by the Lord as his children; and the rich, because they had been brought down into the same condition, the world’s vanity having been made evident to them. Thus the first thing he would have to do is to be content with their humble and low state; and he forbids the rich to be proud. Since it is incomparably the greatest dignity to be introduced into the company of angels, nay, to be made the associates of Christ, he who estimates this favor of God aright, will regard all other things as worthless. Then neither poverty, nor contempt, nor nakedness, nor famine nor thirst, will make his mind so anxious, but that he will sustain himself with this consolation. “Since the Lord has conferred on me the principal thing, it behooves me patiently to bear the loss of other things, which are inferior.”
Behold, how a lowly brother ought to glory in his elevation or exaltation; for if he be accepted of God, he has sufficient consolation in his adoption alone, so as not to grieve unduly for a less prosperous state of life.
10But the rich, in that he is made low, or, in his lowness. He has mentioned the particular for the general; for this admonition pertains to all those who excel in honor; or in dignity, or in any other external thing. He bids them to glory in their lowness or littleness, in order to repress the haughtiness of those who are usually inflated with prosperity. But he calls it lowness, because the manifested kingdom of God ought to lead us to despise the world, as we know that all the things we previously greatly admired, are either nothing or very little things. For Christ, who is not a teacher except of babes, checks by his doctrine all the haughtiness of the flesh. Lest, then, the vain joy of the world should captivate the rich, they ought to habituate themselves to glory in the casting down of their carnal excellency. (103)
As the flower of the grass. Were any one to say that James alludes to the words of Isaiah, I would not much object; but I cannot allow that he quotes the testimony of the Prophet, who speaks not only of the things of this life and the fading character of the world, but of the whole man, both body and soul; [Isa 40:6;] but here what is spoken of is the pomp of wealth or of riches. And the meaning is, that glorying in riches is foolish and preposterous, because they pass away in a moment. The philosophers teach the same thing; but the song is sung to the deaf, until the ears are opened by the Lord to hear the truth concerning the eternity of the celestial kingdom. Hence he mentions brother; intimating that there is no place for this truth, until we are admitted into the order of God’s children.
(103) The opinion of Macknight and some others, that the reference is to the lowness to which the rich were reduced by persecution, does not comport with the passage, for the Apostle afterwards speaks of the shortness of man’s life and its uncertainty, and not of the fading nature of riches, which would have been most suitable, had he in view to comfort the rich at the loss of property. The Christian state was “lowness” according to the estimation of the world.
Though the received reading is ἐν ταῖς πορείαις, yet I agree with Erasmus, and read the last word, πορίαις, without the diphthong “in his riches,” or, with his riches; and the latter I prefer. (104)
(104) The received text is regarded as the best reading; the other is found in very few copies.
12Blessed is the man. After having applied consolation, he moderated the sorrow of those who were severely handled in this world, and again humbled the arrogance of the great. He now draws this conclusion, that they are happy who magnanimously endure troubles and other trials, so as to rise above them. The word temptation may indeed be otherwise understood, even for the stings of lusts which annoy the soul within; but which is here commended, as I think, is fortitude of mind in enduring adversities. It is, however, a paradox, that they are not happy to whom all things come according to their wishes, but such as are not overcome with evils.
For when he is tried. He gives a reason for the preceding sentence; for the crown follows the contest. If, then, it be our chief happiness to be crowned in the kingdom of God, it follows, that the contests with which the Lord tries us, are aids and helps to our happiness. Thus the argument is from the end or the effect: hence we conclude, that the faithful are harassed by so many evils for this purpose, that their piety and obedience may be made manifest, and that they may be thus at length prepared to receive the crown of life.
But they reason absurdly who hence infer that we by fighting merit the crown; for since God has gratuitously appointed it for us, our fighting only renders us fit to receive it.
He adds, that it is promised to those who love God. By speaking thus, he means not that the love of man is the cause of obtaining the crown, (for God anticipates us by his gratuitous love;) but he only intimates that the elect who love him are alone approved by God. He then reminds us that the conquerors of all temptations are those who love God, and that we fail not in courage when we are tried, for no other cause than because the love of the world prevails in us.
13Let no man, when he is tempted. Here, no doubt, he speaks of another kind of temptation. It is abundantly evident that the external temptations, hitherto mentioned, are sent to us by God. In this way God tempted Abraham, (Gen 22:1,) and daily tempts us, that is, he tries us as to what are we by laying before us an occasion by which our hearts are made known. But to draw out what is hid in our hearts is a far different thing from inwardly alluring our hearts by wicked lusts.
He then treats here of inward temptations which are nothing else than the inordinate desires which entice to sin. He justly denies that God is the author of these, because they flow from the corruption of our nature.
This warning is very necessary, for nothing is more common among men than to transfer to another the blame of the evils they commit; and they then especially seem to free themselves, when they ascribe it to God himself. This kind of evasion we constantly imitate, delivered down to us as it is from the first man. For this reason James calls us to confess our own guilt, and not to implicate God, as though he compelled us to sin.
But the whole doctrine of scripture seems to be inconsistent with this passage; for it teaches us that men are blinded by God, are given up to a reprobate mind, and delivered over to filthy and shameful lusts. To this I answer, that probably James was induced to deny that we are tempted by God by this reason, because the ungodly, in order to form an excuse, armed themselves with testimonies of Scripture. But there are two things to be noticed here: when Scripture ascribes blindness or hardness of heart to God, it does not assign to him the beginning of this blindness, nor does it make him the author of sin, so as to ascribe to him the blame: and on these two things only does James dwell.
Scripture asserts that the reprobate are delivered up to depraved lusts; but is it because the Lord depraves or corrupts their hearts? By no means; for their hearts are subjected to depraved lusts, because they are already corrupt and vicious. But since God blinds or hardens, is he not the author or minister of evil? Nay, but in this manner he punishes sins, and renders a just reward to the ungodly, who have refused to be ruled by his Spirit. (Rom 1:26.) It hence follows that the origin of sin is not in God, and no blame can be imputed to him as though he took pleasure in evils. (Gen 6:6.)
The meaning is, that man in vain evades, who attempts to cast the blame of his vices on God, because every evil proceeds from no other fountain than from the wicked lust of man. And the fact really is, that we are not otherwise led astray, except that every one has his own inclination as his leader and impeller. But that God tempts no one, he proves by this, because he is not tempted with evils (105) For it is the devil who allures us to sin, and for this reason, because he wholly burns with the mad lust of sinning. But God does not desire what is evil: he is not, therefore, the author of doing evil in us.
(105) Literally, “untemptable by evils,” that is, not capable of being tempted or seduced by evils, by things wicked and sinful. He is so pure, that he is not influenced by any evil propensities, that he is not subject to any evil suggestions. It hence follows that he tempts or seduces no man to what is sinful. Being himself unassailable by evils, he cannot seduce others to what is evil. As God cannot be tempted to do what is sinful, he cannot possibly tempt others to sin. The words may thus be rendered, —
13. “Let no one, when seduced, say, ‘By God I am seduced;’ for God is not capable of being seduced by evils, and he himself seduceth no one.”
14When he is drawn away by his own lust. As the inclination and excitement to sin are inward, in vain does the sinner seek an cause from an external impulse. At the same time these two effects of lust ought to be noticed — that it ensnares us by its allurements, and that it does us away; each of which is sufficient to render us guilty. (106)
(106) The words are very striking, — “But every one is tempted (or, seduced) when, by his own lust, he is drawn away, (that is, from what is good,) and is caught by a bait (or, ensnared.)”
He is in the first drawn off from the line of duty, and then he is caught by something that is pleasing and plausible, but like the bait, it has in it a deadly hook.
15Then when lust hath conceived. He first calls that lust which is not any kind of evil affection or desire, but that which is the fountain of all evil affections; by which, as he shews, are conceived vicious broods, which at length break forth into sins. It seems, however, improper, and not according to the usage of Scripture, to restrict the word sin to outward works, as though indeed lust itself were not a sin, and as though corrupt desires, remaining closed up within and suppressed, were not so many sins. But as the use of a word is various, there is nothing unreasonable if it be taken here, as in many other places, for actual sin.
And the Papists ignorantly lay hold on this passage, and seek to prove from it that vicious, yea, filthy, wicked, and the most abominable lusts are not sins, provided there is no assent; for James does not shew when sin begins to be born, so as to be sin, and so accounted by God, but when it breaks forth. For he proceeds gradually and shews that the consummation of sin is eternal death, and that sin arises from depraved desires, and that these depraved desires or affections have their root in lust. It hence follows that men gather fruit in eternal perdition, and fruit which they have procured for themselves.
By perfected sin, therefore, I understand, not any one act of sin perpetrated, but the completed course of sinning. For though death is merited by every sin whatever, yet it is said to be the reward of an ungodly and wicked life. Hence is the dotage of those confuted who conclude from these words, that sin is not mortal until it breaks forth, as they say, into an external act. Nor is this what James treats of; but his object was only this, to teach that there is in us the root of our own destruction.
16Do not err. This is an argument from what is opposite; for as God is the author of all good, it is absurd to suppose him to be the author of evil. To do good is what properly belongs to him, and according to his nature; and from him all good things come to us. Then, whatever evil he does, is not agreeable to his nature. But as it sometimes happens, that he who quits himself well through life, yet in some things fails, he meets this doubt by denying that God is mutable like men. But if God is in all things and always like himself, it hence follows that well-doing is his perpetual work.
This reasoning is far different from that of Plato, who maintained that no calamities are sent on men by God, because he is good; for though it is just that the crimes of men should be punished by God, yet it is not right, with regard to him, to regard among evils that punishment which he justly inflicts. Plato, indeed, was ignorant; but James, leaving to God his right and office of punishing, only removes blame from him. This passage teaches us, that we ought to be so affected by God’s innumerable blessings, which we daily receive from his hand, as to think of nothing but of his glory; and that we should abhor whatever comes to our mind, or is suggested by others, which is not compatible with his praise.
God is called the Father of lights, as possessing all excellency and the highest dignity. And when he immediately adds, that there is in him no shadow of turning, he continues the metaphor; so that we may not measure the brightness of God by the irradiation of the sun which appears to us. (107)
(107) This verse must be taken in connection with what as gone before. When he mentions “every good gift,” it is in opposition to the evil of which he says God is not the author. See Mat 7:11. And “every perfect free-gift,” as δώρημα means, has a reference to the correction of the evil which arises from man himself. And he calls free-gift perfect, because it has no mixture of evil, what he throughout denies that God is the author of. Then the latter part of the verse bears a correspondence with the first. He calls God “the Father of Lights.” Light in the language of scripture means especially two things, the light of truth, divine knowledge and holiness. God is the father, the parent, the origin, the source of these lights. Hence from him descends every good, useful, necessary gift, to deliver men from evil, from ignorance and delusion, and every perfect free-gift to free men from their evil lusts, and to render them holy and happy. And to shew that God is ever the same, he adds, “with whom there is no variableness or the shadow (or shade, of the slightest appearance) of a change;” that is, who never varies in his dealings with men, and shews no symptom of any change, being the author and giver of all good, and the author of no evil, that is, of no sin.
18Of his own will. He now brings forward a special proof of the goodness of God which he had mentioned, even that he has regenerated us unto eternal life. This invaluable benefit every one of the faithful feels in himself. Then the goodness of God, when known by experience, ought to remove from them all a contrary opinion respecting him.
When he says that God of his own will, or spontaneously, hath begotten us, he intimates that he was induced by no other reason, as the will and counsel of God are often set in opposition to the merits of men. What great thing, indeed, would it have been to say that God was not constrained to do this? But he impresses something more, that God according to his own goodwill hath begotten us, and has been thus a cause to himself. It hence follows that it is natural to God to do good.
But this passage teaches us, that as our election before the foundation of the world was gratuitous, so we are illuminated by the grace of God alone as to the knowledge of the truth, so that our calling corresponds with our election. The Scripture shews that we have been gratuitously adopted by God before we were born. But James expresses here something more, that we obtain the right of adoption, because God does also call us gratuitously. (Eph 1:4.) Farther, we hence learn, that it is the peculiar office of God spiritually to regenerate us; for that the same thing is sometimes ascribed to the ministers of the gospel, means no other thing than this, that God acts through them; and it happens indeed through them, but he nevertheless alone doeth the work.
The word begotten means that we become new men, so that we put off our former nature when we are effectually called by God. He adds how God begets us, even by the word of truth, so that we may know that we cannot enter the kingdom of God by any other door.
That we should be a kind of firstfruits of his creatures. The word τινὰ, “some,” has the meaning of likeness, as though he had said, that we are in a manner firstfruits. But this ought not to be restricted to a few of the faithful; but it belongs to all in common. For as man excels among all creatures, so the Lord elects some from the whole mass and separates them as a holy offering, to himself. (108) It is no common nobility into which God extols his own children. Then justly are they said to be excellent as firstfruits, when God’s image is renewed in them.
(108) The firstfruits being a part and a pledge of the coming harvest, to retain the metaphor, we must regard “creatures” here as including all the saved in future ages. Hence their opinion is to be preferred, who regard the first converts, who were Jews, as the firstfruits.
19Let every man. Were this a general sentence, the inference would be farfetched; but as he immediately adds a sentence respecting the word of truth suitable to the last verse, I doubt not but that he accommodates this exhortation peculiarly to the subject in hand. Having then set before us the goodness of God, he shews how it becomes us to be prepared to receive the blessing which he exhibits towards us. And this doctrine is very useful, for spiritual generation is not a work of one moment. Since some remnants of the old man ever abide in us, we must necessarily be through life renewed, until the flesh be abolished; for either our perverseness, or arrogance, or sloth, is a great impediment to God in perfecting in us his work. Hence, when James would have us to be swift to hear, he commends promptitude, as though he had said, “When God so freely and kindly presents himself to you, you also ought to render yourselves teachable, lest your slowness should cause him to desist from speaking.”
But inasmuch as we do not calmly hear God speaking to us, when we seem to ourselves to be very wise, but by our haste interrupt him when addressing us, the Apostle requires us to be silent, to be slow to speak. And, doubtless, no one can be a true disciple of God, except he hears him in silence. He does not, however, require the silence of the Pythagorean school, so that it should not be right to inquire whenever we desire to learn what is necessary to be known; but he would only have us to correct and restrain our forwardness, that we may not, as it commonly happens, unseasonably interrupt God, and that as long as he opens his sacred mouth, we may open to him our hearts and our ears, and not prevent him to speak.
Slow to wrath. Wrath also, I think, is condemned with regard to the hearing which God demands to be given to him, as though making a tumult it disturbed and impeded him, for God cannot be heard except when the mind is calm and sedate. Hence, he adds, that as long as wrath bears rule there is no place for the righteousness of God. In short, except the heat of contention be banished, we shall never observe towards God that calm silence of which he has just spoken.
21Wherefore lay apart. He concludes by saying how the word of life is to be received. And first, indeed, he intimates that it cannot be rightly received except it be implanted, or strike roots in us. For the expression, to receive the implanted word, ought to be thus explained, “to receive it, that it may be really implanted.” For he alludes to seed often sown on and ground, and not received into the moist bosom of the earth; or to plants, which being cast on the ground, or laid on dead wood, soon wither. He then requires that it should be a living implanting, by which the word becomes as it were united with our heart.
He at the same time shews the way and manner of this reception, even with meekness. By this word he means humility and the readiness of a mind disposed to learn, such as Isaiah describes when he says,
“On whom does my Spirit rest, except on the humble and meek?” (Isa 57:15.)
Hence it is, that so far profit in the school of God, because hardly one in a hundred renounces the stubbornness of his own spirit, and gently submits to God; but almost all are conceited and refractory. But if we desire to be the living plantation of God, we must subdue our proud hearts and be humble, and labor to become like lambs, so as to suffer ourselves to be ruled and guided by our Shepherd.
But as men are never thus tamed, so as to have a calm and meek heart, except they are purged from depraved affections, so he bids us to lay aside uncleanness and redundancy of wickedness. And as James borrowed a comparison from agriculture, it was necessary for him to observe this order, to begin by rooting up noxious weeds. And since he addressed all, we may hence conclude that these are the innate evils of our nature, and that they cleave to us all; yea, since he addresses the faithful, he shews that we are never wholly cleansed from them in this life, but that they are continually sprouting up, and therefore he requires that care should be constantly taken to eradicate them. As the word of God is especially a holy thing; to be fitted to receive it, we must put off the filthy things by which we have been polluted.
Under the word κακία, he comprehends hypocrisy and obstinacy as well as unlawful desires or lusts. Not satisfied with specifying the seat of wickedness as being in the soul of man, he teaches us that so abounding is the wickedness that dwells there, that it overflows, or that it rises up as it were into a heap; and doubtless, whosoever will well examine himself will find that there is within him an immense chaos of evils. (109)
Which is able to save. It is a high eulogy on heavenly truth, that we obtain through it a sure salvation; and this is added, that we may learn to seek and love and magnify the word as a treasure that is incomparable. It is then a sharp goad to chastise our idleness, when he says that the word which we are wont to hear so negligently, is the means of our salvation, though for this purpose the power of saving is not ascribed to the word, as if salvation is conveyed by the external sound of the word, or as if the office of saving is taken away from God and transferred elsewhere; for James speaks of the word which by faith penetrates into the hearts of men, and only intimates that God, the author of salvation, conveys it by his Gospel.
(109) What renders this passage unsatisfactory is the meaning given to περισσεία, rendered by some “superfluity,” and by others “redundancy.” The verb περισσεύω means not only to abound, but also to be a residue, to remain, to be a remnant. See Mat 14:20; Luk 9:17. And its derivative περίσσευμα is used in the sense of a remnant or a remainder, Mar 8:8; and this very word is used in the Sept., for יתר which means a residue, a remnant, or what remains, Eze 6:8. Let it have this meaning here, and the sense will not only be clear, but very striking. James was addressing those who were Christians; and he exhorted them to throw away every uncleanness and remnant of wickedness, or evil, as the word κακία more properly means. See Act 8:22; 1Pe 2:16
“Every uncleanness,” or filthiness, means every kind of uncleanness arising from lustful and carnal indulgences; and the “remnant of wickedness,” in thought and in deed, most suitably follows.
22Be ye doers of the word. The doer here is not the same as in Rom 2:13, who satisfied the law of God and fulfilled it in every part, but the doer is he who from the heart embraces God’s word and testifies by his life that he really believes, according to the saying of Christ,
“Blessed are they who hear God’s word and keep it,”
(Luk 11:28;)
for he shews by the fruits what that implanting is, before mentioned. We must further observe, that faith with all its works is included by James, yea, faith especially, as it is the chief work which God requires from us. The import of the whole is, that we ought to labor that the word of the Lord should strike root in us, so that it may afterwards fructify. (110)
(110) Calvin takes no notice of the last sentence, “deceiving yourselves.” The participle means deceiving by false reasoning.; it may be rendered with Doddridge, “sophistically deceiving yourselves.”
23He is like to a man. Heavenly doctrine is indeed a mirror in which God presents himself to our view; but so that we may be transformed unto his image, as Paul says in 2Co 3:18. But here he speaks of the external glance of the eye, not of the vivid and efficacious meditation which penetrates into the heart. It is a striking comparison, by which he briefly intimates, that a doctrine merely heard and not received inwardly into the heart avails nothing, because it soon vanishes away.
25The perfect law of liberty. After having spoken of empty speculation, he comes now to that penetrating intuition which transforms us to the image of God. And as he had to do with the Jews, he takes the word law, familiarly known to them, as including the whole truth of God.
But why he calls it a perfect law, and a law of liberty, interpreters have not been able to understand; for they have not perceived that there is here a contrast, which may be gathered from other passages of Scripture. As long as the law is preached by the external voice of man, and not inscribed by the finger and Spirit of God on the heart, it is but a dead letter, and as it were a lifeless thing. It is, then, no wonder that the law is deemed imperfect, and that it is the law of bondage; for as Paul teaches in Gal 4:24, separated from Christ, it generates to condemn and as the same shews to us in Rom 8:13, it can do nothing but fill us with diffidence and fear. But the Spirit of regeneration, who inscribes it on our inward parts, brings also the grace of adoption. It is, then, the same as though James had said, “The teaching of the law, let it no longer lead you to bondage, but, on the contrary, bring you to liberty; let it no longer be only a schoolmaster, but bring you to perfection: it ought to be received by you with sincere affection, so that you may lead a godly and a holy life.”
Moreover, since it is a blessing of the Old Testament that the law of God should reform us, as it appears from Jer 31:33, and other passages, it follows that it cannot be obtained until we come to Christ. And, doubtless, he alone is the end and perfection of the law; and James adds liberty, as an inseparable associate, because the Spirit of Christ never regenerates but that he becomes also a witness and an earnest of our divine adoption, so as to free our hearts from fear and trembling.
And continueth. This is firmly to persevere in the knowledge of God; and when he adds, this man shall be blessed in his deed, or work, he means that blessedness is to be found in doing, not in cold hearing. (111)
(111) It may be rendered thus, — “The same shall be blessed in (or by) the doing of it,” that is, the work. The very doing of the law of liberty, of what the gospel prescribes, makes a man blessed or happy.
26Seem to be religious. He now reproves even in those who boasted that they were doers of the law, a vice under which hypocrites commonly labor, that is, the wantonness of the tongue in detraction. He has before touched on the duty of restraining the tongue, but for a different end; for he then bade silence before God, that we might be more fitted to learn. He speaks now of another thing, that the faithful should not employ their tongue in evil speaking.
It was indeed needful that this vice should be condemned, when the subject was the keeping of the law; for they who have put off the grosser vices, are especially subject to this disease. He who is neither an adulterer, nor a thief, nor a drunkard, but, on the contrary, seems brilliant with some outward shew of sanctity will set himself off by defaming others, and this under the pretense of zeal, but really through the lust of slandering.
The object here, then, was to distinguish between the true worshippers of God and hypocrites, who are so swollen with Pharisaic pride, that they seek praise from the defects of others. If any one, he says, seems to be religious, that is, who has a show of sanctity, and the meantime flatters himself by speaking evil of others, it is hence evident that he does not truly serve God. For by saying that his religion is vain, he not only intimates that other virtues are marred by the stain of evil-speaking, but that the conclusion is, that the zeal for religion which appears is not sincere.
But deceiveth his own heart. I do not approve of the version of Erasmus — “But suffers his heart to err;” for he points out the fountain of that arrogance to which hypocrites are addicted, through which, being blinded by an immoderate love of themselves, they believe themselves to be far better than they really are; and hence, no doubt, is the disease of slandering, because the wallet, as Aesop says in his Apologue, hanging behind, is not seen. Rightly, then, has James, wishing to remove the effect, that is, the lust of evil-speaking, added the cause, even that hypocrites flatter themselves immoderately. For they would be ready to forgive were they in their turn to acknowledge themselves to be in need of forgiveness. Hence the flatteries by which they deceive themselves as to their own vices, make them such supercilious censors of others.
27Pure religion. As he passes by those things which are of the greatest moment in religion, he does not define generally what religion is, but reminds us that religion without the things he mentions is nothing; as when one given to wine and gluttony boasts that he is temperate, and another should object, and say that the temperate man is he who does not indulge in excess as to wine or eating; his object is not to express the whole of what temperance is, but to refer only to one thing, suitable to the subject in hand. For they are in vain religious of whom he speaks, as they are for the most part trifling pretenders.
James then teaches us that religion is not to be estimated by the pomp of ceremonies; but that there are important duties to which the servants of God ought to attend.
To visit in necessity is to extend a helping hand to alleviate such as are in distress. And as there are many others whom the Lord bids us to succor, in mentioning widows and orphans, he states a part for the whole. There is then no doubt but that under one particular thing he recommends to us every act of love, as though he had said, “Let him who would be deemed religious, prove himself to be such by self denial and by mercy and benevolence towards his neighbors.”
And he says, before God, to intimate that it appears in deed otherwise to men, who are led astray by external masks, but that we ought to seek what pleases him. By God and Father, we are to understand God who is a father.
